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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Lori Kinder MacArthur for the Master of Science in Political
Science presented November 3, 1995.

Title: John Rawls, Feminism, and the Gendered Self.

John Rawls's theory of justice, which he calls "justice as fairness," has proven to
be most influential with regard to the course of contemporary political theory. In both of
Rawls's books, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, his aim was to present a
theoretically-compelling defense of deontological liberalism, and to present a set of
principles by which to fairly order a just society.
While Rawls's project has attracted a fair number of proponents over the years, it
has also been a popular target for liberal and nonliberal critics alike. A recurrent theme
among these criticisms has been an objection with Rawls's conception of the self as
presented in A Theory of Justice.
This thesis will focus on frmini'..lls' criticisms of Rawls's conception of persons.
In general, feminists contend that Rawlsian liberalism suffers a structural gender bias
resulting from Rawls's conception of the self. Rawls's notion of the self, feminists argue,
rests on male or masculine attributes.

2

I will demonstrate in the course of this thesis that feminists' charges fail on two
accounts. First, feminists do not present an accurate reading of Rawls's conception of
persons in either A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism. Second, in reviewing
feminist approaches to gendering the self (which is integral to their critique), it will be
shown that feminists are unable to gender the self in a theoretically defensible manner.
Thus, feminists cannot make the claim that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine
concept. It follows from these twin defects that feminist contentions fail to prove that
Rawls's theory is gender biased.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

During recent years, partisans and critics alike have acknowledged the magnitude
of John Rawls's contribution to contemporary moral and political theory.

1

His renown is

largely the result of A Theory of Justice-a work that served as the first systematic
account of his theory of justice, otherwise denominated "justice as fairness," which can
be broadly regarded as a theoretical defense of "deontological" liberalism. 2 Since this
publication, the corpus of his work has been steadfastly devoted to the advancement and
clarification of "justice as fairness," and has been driven by the explicit intention of
remaining faithful to "the spirit and content of A Theory of Justice ." 3
In political theory, it has been observed that Rawls's venture yielded three
noteworthy effects that have influenced the course of the discipline. Of Rawls's
contributions meriting comment the first is perhaps the most profound: A Theory of

1

While "political theory" and "political philosophy" are often used interchangeably, the preference
of the author is towards the fonner term as it is generally observed to be both broader in scope and more
closely linked with the discipline of political study. On these related points, see John Gunnell, Political
Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1987), xiv; and
Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), 22.
2

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971 ). NB: Hereafter, A
Theory of Justice will also be referred to as Theory, with the latter title denoting the former. As defined by
Rawls, in Theory (30), a "deontological theory" is "one that either does not specify the good independently
from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good." Or more commonly stated, the right
is given priority over the good.
3

John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), xiv.

2

Justice signaled a renaissance within political theory during the 1970s, with the project

itself being the primary inspiration animating this movement.
For many, Rawls was perceived to have undertaken in Theory "a project of heroic
proportion and classical: articulating a comprehensive and universal theory of justice
founded on first principles."4 The publication of this work seemed to mark not only the
restoration of political theorizing as a salient enterprise in the present-day study of
politics-a project that had withered during the positivist ascendance of the 1950s and
1960s-but it also signified, in the words of Amy Gutmann, that "grand political theory
[was] once again alive in the academy." 5
Second, though there exists many historical and contemporary variants of
liberalism, Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness" has been regarded as one of the most
theoretically-compelling and influential defenses of liberalism to date. Theory, in turn,
has been judged the "paradigm statement of contemporary liberal theory ." 6
Third, Rawls' s project has been recognized as indelibly altering the conceptual
framework of contemporary liberalism and-more broadly-the conventional lines of
political discourse. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift outline:

4

Patrick Neal, "Justice as Fairness: Political or Metaphysical?" Political Theory 18 (1990): 24.

5

Amy Gutmann, "The Central Role of Rawls's Theory," Dissent (Summer 1989): 338. For a
discussion of positivism in the discipline of political studies and history of political theory, see Gunnell,
chap. I passim.
6

Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Publishers, 1992), vii.

3

his theory established the terrain upon which subsequent political-theoretical
battles were to be fought...[so that both] critics and defenders of versions of
liberalism other than that offered by Rawls have formulated their positions in
terms that make explicit reference to his theory, so that in many ways Rawls
simply did define the agenda and continues to do so. 7
All told, the standard terms of political inquiry (such as, equality, liberty,
freedom, etc.) were essentially reinterpreted by Rawls's theory, so that the very
conceptual premises and principles on which political theory operate have shifted.
However the relative importance of the aforementioned factors are weighted,
taken together they have indubitably secured for Rawls a central station within both
liberalism and, more broadly, political theory. Though many sympathize with Rawls, and
ardently defend his theory of justice, the conspicuousness of Rawls's position has also
attracted a fair number of detractors. Their criticisms range from specific objections to
the principles of "justice as fairness," to more encompassing challenges intended to
undermine the entirety of the liberal tradition. Nevertheless, the attentiveness of both
critics and liberal adherents to this so-called nonpareil statement of liberalism makes
evident the significance of Theory and Rawls's ongoing project to fashion a theoretically
cogent version of deontological liberalism.
In contemporary debate one recurrent point has loomed large in criticism of

Theory, as Janet Moore explains, Rawls's "autonomous, self-conscious, and selfconstitutive subject has drawn heavy fire from feminist and other critical theorists, as well
as structuralist, poststructuralist, and postmodern philosophers engaged in critiques of

7

Ibid., 1.

4

classical liberalism and its social contract theories." 8 Much of the current controversy
centering on Rawls's theory, spins around his liberal conception of the person. In
examining a facet of this debate, this work will analyze feminists' criticisms of Rawls's
conception of the person. Before delving into the fine points of this analysis, however,
several preliminary considerations pertaining to the nature of feminist claims ought to be
reviewed.
Because feminist arguments are directed towards Rawls's conception of persons,
the very term "person" or "self' is of interest. 9 To clarify, feminist contentions are not
directed at any generic definition of the self (i.e., the combination of those elements that
we consider requisite to be human, such as body, thoughts, emotions, etc.); rather, they
are concerned with the more controversial assumptions about the self (i.e., particular
characteristics, interests, predispositions, nature, etc.) which are indeed subject to
disparate interpretations. Feminists are thus concerned with Rawls's "interpretation" of
the self.
This aside, it seems as though the question of what constitutes an accurate
interpretation of personhood would be a rather straightforward one. For theorists,
however, the issue is a good deal more complex, and the way in which the question of
personhood is answered is of consequence. The ontological commitments (i.e.,

8

Janet Moore, "Covenant and Feminist Reconstruction's of Subjectivity within Theories of
Justice," in Law and Contemporary Problems 55 (Summer 1992): 159.
9

Tue distinction, if any, between the term "person" and "self' is negligible; accordingly, the terms
will be employed interchangeably.

5

interpretations of the self) of political theorists have important structural ramifications for
their theories, because premises, concepts, principles and conclusions are-for the most
part-rooted in their vision of persons.
Recognizing the significance of this fact, feminists have been concerned with how
political theorists interpret the self as it relates to women. Importantly, feminists have
introduced the notion of gender into the discussion of the self in what seems an attempt to
redefine the contemporary debate over the liberal self. Illustrative of this point, feminist
Alison Jaggar maintains that: "[S]ince every political theory is grounded on a certain
conception of human nature, each political theory incorporates some assumptions about
the nature of women and men." 10 On the surface, this statement seems rather innocuous
and unassuming; however, it reveals two fundamental points of departure introduced by
feminists. First, when discussing the notion of the self, gender is considered a relevant
factor. Second, this statement implies that men and women may have distinct natures that
cannot simply be subsumed under the single, broad category of human nature. What

J aggar and many other feminists conclude is that political theorists make assumptions
about the self and, intentionally or not, make presumptions about the nature of men and
women respectively.
Although feminists hold that Rawls employs a specific notion of the self based on
assumptions about the nature of persons, it should be noted from the outset that in
Theory, Rawls does not specifically address gender, much less does he imply that women

IO

Jaggar, 21.
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and men are either similar or distinct. Indeed, Rawls seems altogether reluctant to
approach the issue of gender, or he is simply blind to the fact that women may possess a
different nature than men.
It is precisely this "silence" on the issue of gender that has been problematic for
feminists, because in their view it implies "either that there are no differences between
women and men that are relevant to political philosophy or that women are not part of the
subject matter of political philosophy." 11 The salient question then is whether Rawls's
notion of the self applies only to men-in which case his assumptions of human nature,
while seemingly generic, are only really indicative of man; or whether his notion of the
self is applicable to either gender-in which case there is a single version of human
nature common to both sexes.
Many feminists have found neither answer to that question acceptable. It seems
obvious why feminists would reject the first alternative: women would be excluded
entirely from the scope of analysis. However, it is not immediately evident as to why
feminists would chafe at the second alternative. While some feminists (namely
traditional liberal feminists) reaffirm the gender-neutral account of human nature that
appears to be on display in Rawls's theory of justice, the most common response by
feminists has been to debunk the notion that the nature or experiences of women are akin
to those of men. 12 Thus, they reject the gender neutral stance.

11

1bid.

12

The strong thesis being that women's nature (i.e. biology) is essentially different, the weak
thesis being that women's social experiences (i.e. social roles) are markedly divergent.

7

If this is the case-that the notion of the self is in some fashion gendered male or

female-to which gendered self is Rawls's theory applicable? Feminists have primarily
responded by arguing that the constitutive assumptions of the liberal self are based on
male (or, as postmodern feminists say, masculine) values. 13 Liberal concepts of
rationality, agency, and morality underlying this notion of personhood "have been
defined exclusively in masculine terms." 14 Insofar as Rawls's theory is applied to women
then, they are either excluded altogether or marginalized as a result of being "forced to
think through their experience via male categories." 15
Rawls's seemingly gender-neutral approach to the conception of the self, for
feminists, indicates a gender bias-albeit a bias more subversive and subtle than an
explicit excJusion of women. Of feminists challenging Rawlsian liberalism, then, the full
allegation is as follows: Rawlsian liberalism, similar to other variants of this political
theory, exhibits a structural male gender bias, and this inherent prejudice rests on his
conception of the person. 16 Because Rawls's theory is grounded on an exclusionary

13

The use of the term "male" denotes more of a biological position, while the term "masculine"
denotes "not a biological category but a cognitive style, and epistemological stance." See Susan Bordo,
"The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 11, no. 3
(Spring 1986): 451.
14

Susan J. Hekman, Gender and Knowledge: Elements of Postmodern Feminism (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1990), 34.
15

Beverly Thiele, "Vanishing act in social and political thought: Tricks of the trade," in Feminist
Challenges: Social and Political Theory, ed. Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Gross (Boston: Northeastern
University Press, 1987), 42.
16

Sinopoli makes a similar note, claiming that feminist arguments of "structural gender bias in
liberal political thought (at least in the social contract tradition) deriving from a liberal conception of the

8

vision of the self, say feminists, he effectively denies true representation of women in his
analysis.
For students of political theory, it is common knowledge that Rawls has
responded to other critiques of his conception of the self, specifically those advanced by
the communitarian camp. Rawls has not issued a parallel rejoinder to feminist critics,
however. While Rawls did recently claim "that the alleged difficulties in discussing
problems of gender ... can be overcome," he has not expound upon this assertion. 17 Given
that this is the case, why Rawls's silence with regard to feminist criticisms? Perhaps
Rawls does not find feminist critiques theoretically credible, and thus unworthy of a
response. Then again, he may have neither the time nor the interest necessary to issue a
rejoinder. The reason as to why a dialogue matching the communitarian-liberal debate
has not emerged between Rawls and the feminists in the end is left open to conjecture.
It is plausible to suggest, however, that this absence of debate is to some degree a

reflection of the fact that liberal political theory and feminism are considered separate,
distinct disciplines or cannons of thought. 18 "Feminist theory and political theory are
often treated as if they operated in two separate worlds," notes Nancy Hirschmann.

self,". See Richard C. Sinopoli. "Feminism and Liberal Theory," in American Political Science Review 85,
no. 1(March1991): 223.
17

18

Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxix.

The author's inclination is to refer to political theory as a discipline, and feminists theory as a
cannon of scholarship or thought.

9

"[B ]ut if they are in two worlds, it is not because they are inherently opposed but rather
because there are very few people who speak both languages." 19
This comment-that there exist two languages that must be transcended prior to a
meaningful dialogue-unmasks another potential obstacle. That is, these two languages
may be rooted in two entirely different paradigms, each based on irreconcilable
foundational assumptions and mutual1y-unintelligible conceptual frameworks. 20 Indeed
much of feminist theory has attempted to move beyond the theoretical confines of
liberalism, but according to Hirschmann the problem is that "by circumventing [liberal
theory] and setting up [feminist theory's] own assumptions and conceptual framework,
feminist theory becomes incomprehensible in the epistemology that liberalism defines." 21
Reflexively, feminist theory may have become equally incomprehensible to liberal
theorists. If this is the case-that liberal and feminist theory, in some sense, represent
two divergent paradigms-then discussing the two may be more troublesome than one
might initially expect. 22

19

Nancy J Hirschmann, Rethinking Obligation: A Feminist Method For Political Theory (New
York: Cornell University Press, 1992), 24. Richard Sinopoli, in "Feminism and Liberal Theory" (231 ),
makes a similar argument by claiming that "political scientists cannot be expected to be familiar with
[feminist] literature".
2

°For a discussion of the term "paradigm" and what is involved in "paradigm debates," refer to
Thomas S. Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1970), passim.
21

22

Hirschmann, Rethinking Obligation, 26.

0n this point, in Scientific Revolutions ( 109-110), Kuhn suggests that when two "schools
disagree about what is a problem and what [is] a solution, they will inevitably talk through each other when
debating the relative merits of respective paradigms. In the partially circular arguments that regularly result.
each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a
few of those dictated by its opponent." Thus, "logical contact" between two paradigms is problematic.

10

Any attempt at constructing a dialogue between feminism and liberalism will
necessarily confront the task of bridging the two languages. This may require the mere
harmonization of the two different languages, or it may entail the more formidable task of
transcending the cognate paradigms of liberalism and feminism. This brings us to the
most general aim of the thesis: I intend to push the discussion beyond what could amount
to an impasse of "disagreement" and to initiate a dialogue of "critical" inquiry between
feminist theorists and Rawls. 23
More specifically, the purpose of this inquiry is to explore the contours of feminist
contentions with Rawls' s liberal conception of the self and, in so doing, provide a critical
analysis of the theoretical cogency and aptness of these criticisms. I will argue that
feminist challenges to Rawls fail in two interrelated ways. First, feminist criticism is
based on overdrawn and incorrect interpretations of Rawls's conception of persons.
Second, feminists' arguments that posit the liberal conception of persons to be
characteristically male or masculine are based on dubious evidence, at best. All told,
feminist contentions do not correctly address the shortcomings of the Rawlsian self;

23

Jerry Cederblom and David W. Paulsen make an important distinction between the terms
"disagreement" and "critical reasoning" which aptJy apply here: "When one person asserts a position and
another merely denies it, or states an opposing position, this is disagreement, and it is indeed
commonplace ...Critical reasoning, however, is a process that involves looking at the reasons on which an
opposing view is based and making an assessment of those reasons. Its immediate aim is to determine
whether the position offered is worth believing, but it is also a basis for further inquiry and discussion which
may move both participants to a better understanding of the issue at hand." See Jerry Cederblom and David
W. Paulsen, Critical Reasoning (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1986), 1.
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therefore, it can be shown that Rawls's conception of justice has the requisite theoretical
resources to respond to feminist assertions.

The Method, Concepts, and Contours of Inquiry
Although the topic of inquiry lies at the crossroads between two disciplines or
cannons of scholarship, this undertaking should be regarded as a work within the
discipline of political theory. Presently, the dispute within academia over the proper
scope and method of political theory, in juxtaposition to political science, has relented
somewhat. Thus, the former line of demarcation between the study of political science
(associated with logical positivism and the empirical goal of prediction) and political
theory (linked with more normative and conceptual concerns) has been blurred. 24
Nevertheless, this inquiry treats issues that fall within the traditional purview of political
theory; thus, it is methodologically fashioned by normative and conceptual analysis.
The remainder of this section will introduce and define for the reader concepts
which together form the fabric and framework of the forthcoming analysis. These
concepts include: ( 1) Feminist theory; (2) The gendered self; (3) Liberal political theory;
and (4) Rawls's theories of "justice as fairness" and "political liberalism." By articulating
the conceptual terrain in which this analysis is situated, and delineating the parameters of
the debate, this section will thereby refine and narrow the scope of investigation.
Feminist Theory

24

Gunnell, 10.

12

Feminist theory can be primarily understood "as a network of normative,
conceptual, empirical and methodological claims," the aim of which is to provide a
theoretical framework capable of: ( 1) describing women's oppression; (2) explaining the
reasons for their oppression; and (3) providing a systematic political or social theory
capable of women's liberation. 25 Beyond this definition of feminist theory, however,
conceiving of feminist thought as a coherent or unified cannon of thought is difficult.
The stated goal of women's liberation, the amelioration of injustices done to
women as a group, fails to provide any deeper cohesiveness of purpose for feminists.
Indeed the ostensible solidarity of feminism is quickly riven asunder once we look
beneath the superficial veneer of feminist consensus and recognize the wide range of
feminist sub-versions: liberal feminism, Marxist liberalism, socialist feminism, radical
feminism, postmodern feminism, existential feminism, and so on. 26 While there is much
overlap among feminist theories regarding the basic recognition that women have been
and continue to be discriminated against based on their sex, the descriptive and
explanatory accounts (and thus the prescribed paths to women's liberation) vary widely. 27

-"5 Jaggar, 9.
26

The enumerated list of approaches to feminist theory appears in Rosemarie Tong's book,
Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), I.
27

On this issue, Jean Grimshaw states that simply because most feminists believe that "women are
badly treated and that they suffer from systematic social injustice because of their sex, it does not follow
from this that any consensus is available as to the precise forms this oppression or injustice takes, or as to
how they should be remedied." See Jean Grimshaw, Feminist Philosophers: Women's Perspectives on
Philosophical Traditions (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 20.

13

While feminists have made partial progress in the development of a theoretical
route to women's liberation, they lament the fact that there exists a dearth of available
comprehensive feminist political or social theories. Catherine MacKinnon explains:
"Feminism has no theory of the state." 28 Consequently, feminists have looked to
mainstream political theories of state (e.g., liberalism, Marxism, socialism, etc.) as
possible vehicles by which to achieve women's liberation. Despite this deficiency in
feminist theory, the descriptive and explanatory principles alone (which feminist have
proven prolific in generating) have facilitated feminism's rise to prominence as a method
of critique.
Given the above description of feminist theory, several relevant considerations
ought to be addressed regarding the treatment of feminism in this inquiry. For the task at
hand, feminist theory is perhaps best understood as a method of critique rather than as a
rival political theory akin to Rawls's theory of justice. 29
Cognizant of the broad spectrum of ideas and theories existing within feminist
thought, some limitations on the treatment of feminist theory must be imposed. While
addressing only one version of feminist theory would limit the scope (and hence the
value) of this project, an attempt to address feminist thought in all of its variegated forms
is beyond the ambit of this inquiry. Subsequently, my approach to feminist theory will be

28

Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989), 157.
29

0n this theme, see Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, "Introduction: Beyond the Politics of
Gender," in Feminism as Critique, eds. Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 199 l ).
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specifically organized around three distinguishable feminists' conceptions of the
gendered self, which in large measure form the basis of their critiques of Rawls's notion
of personhood.
Lastly, this seems the proper place to explain why I will focus only on feminists'
critiques of the liberal self. In general, feminists have devoted increasing attention to
questions surrounding the notion of persons, as it effects both mainstream and feminist
theoretical inquiry. As feminists have had to concede that their standard critiques against
liberalism could be accommodated within the purview of contemporary liberal theory, the
trend within feminism has been to refocus their critique by concentrating specifically on
the liberal self; a critique they believe cannot be subsumed and amended within the
liberal framework. 30 In addition, feminists have devoted much energy to exploring and
developing their own conception of the gendered self, which they hope will prove
superior to the allegedly gender-neutral liberal self.

31

Given these factors, I think the

focus of inquiry is warranted, as feminist critiques of the liberal self are of central
importance in comprehending the contemporary debate between liberals and feminists.

3

°For a brief discussion on this matter, see Benhabib and Cornell, 11.

31

Though Okin has concentrated her efforts on critiquing the position of the family within liberal
theory, she notes that "much feminist intellectual energy in the 1980s" has been devoted to developing a
conception of the self different than that defined by Rawls and other liberal theorists. See Susan Moller
Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 15.

15

The Gendered Self
In conceptual terms, the notion that the self should be gendered in some fashion
has been a leitmotiv in feminist writings; ironically, it is also a notion that has been a
rising source of disagreement among feminists. Broadly speaking, the concept "gendered
self' can be taken to mean a description of persons that attempts to identify and take into
account relevant differences between the sexes-a conception of persons that is in some
sense constituted by one's gender identity. While a few feminists have been reluctant to
support gendering the subject in this way, the overwhelming majority of feminists have
been inclined to support some notion of a gendered self. Even so, feminist interpretations
of this notion have taken on different complexions.
During the 1960s, feminists "pursued a traditional liberal model of equality, a
model premised on the notion that women and men are in all important respects the same
and should be treated the same." 32 Today, this position is associated with traditional
liberal feminists, or "sameness feminists," who reject the notion of the gendered self and
instead "advocate gender-neutral categories that do not rely on gender stereotypes to
differentiate between men and women." 33 The implication of this gender-neutral
approach is that the underlying commonality between men and women is highlighted and

32
33

Anne C. Dailey, "Feminism's Return to Liberalism," The Yale Law Journal 102 (1993): 1267.

Joan C. WilJiams, "Deconstructing Gender," in Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and
Gender, eds. Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 110.
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privileged over any account of the self that is gender differentiated (i.e. the self exists
prior to a self that is specifically gendered).
During the early 1970s, many feminists began to reject the gender-neutral account
of the self supported by traditional liberal feminism and found within liberal political
theory, and instead emphasized the differences between the sexes. These feminists
argued that the liberal notion of the self did not adequately take into account important
sexual differences (i.e., biological, psychological, cultural, and/or epistemological) that
exist between men and women. In turn, they began to question the ability of liberalism to
implement equal opportunity if, in their view, the liberal model could not take into
account relevant sexual differences in their description of the subject. No longer was
feminist theory going to "aim for parity, equivalence, or disinterested treatment under the
prevailing standards; rather, it starts from, and affirms, the difference between men and
women."34
Given this rejection of the gender-neutral approach to the self, the trend within
feminism shifted toward what has been called the "difference approach," an approach that
affirmed the notion of the gendered self. "The philosophy underlying the difference
approach", explains MacKinnon, "is that sex is a difference, a division, a distinction,
beneath which lies a stratum of human commonality, sameness." 35 Juxtaposed with the
34Christine Sypnowich, "Justice, Community, and the Antinomies of Feminist Theory," Political
Theory 21 (August 1993): 490.

35Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Difference and Dominance," in Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in
Law and Gender, eds. Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991),
82.
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neutral concept of the self explained above, the difference approach suggests that as
persons we are gendered as women and men before any common humanity. In the view
of these feminists, then, humans must be considered gendered selves and not simply
gender-neutral selves-for gender-neutral selves deny the fundamental differences
between men's and women's nature. The implication here is that the primary,
fundamental determinant of our identity is gender.
In the 1980s, this difference theme continued to resonate in feminist theory;
however, it took an interesting new turn. Feminists were no longer simply debating the
inherent differences between men and women, they were also considering important
differences between women themselves. For many feminists, the definition of the
"essential" woman of the 1970s appeared flawed, as it excluded a whole range of women
whose characteristics varied according to experience, color, race, ethnicity, class, and
other factors. This, in tum, launched a new series of conflicts among feminists coined
"the essentialism-anti-essentialism debates." 36
Responding to charges of essentialism, the trend in feminist theory at present
indicates a partial retreat from the 1970s idea of the gendered self. 37 In recoiling from
36

Naomi Schor, "Introduction," in The Essential Difference, eds. Naomi Schor and Elizabeth
Weed (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), vii.
37

Elizabeth Grosz defines essentialism as follows: "Women's essence is assumed to be given and
universal and is usually, though not necessarily, identified with women's biology and "natural"
characteristics. Essentialism usually entails biologism and naturalism, but there are cases in which women's
essence is seen to reside not in nature or biology but in certain given psychological characteristicsnurturance, empathy, supportiveness, non-competitiveness, and so on. Or Women's essence may be
attributed to certain activities and procedures which may or may not be dictated by biology observable in
social practices, intuitiveness, emotional responses, concern and commitment to helping others, etc.
Essentialism entails the belief that those characteristics defined as women's essence are shared in common
by a11 women at al times: it implies a limit on the variations and possibilities of change-it is not possible
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this essentialist notion of the gendered self, however, many feminists have not advocated
a return to the gender-neutral conception of persons. Instead they have attempted to
dodge the charges of universalism and essentialism linked to the earlier notion of the self
by describing the gendered self as a situated creature embedded within a particular
historical, social and cultural context.
In light of this history, three feminist approaches to the subject that dominate
contemporary feminism can be delineated and thus will be considered in this analysis:
cultural feminism, relational feminism, and postmodern feminism. 38 What "unites" these
positions, argues Christine Sypnowich, is their "critique of the atomistic individual as a
male construction with its roots in the Enlightenment and [their] suspicion of the
masculine world of Cartesian epistemology, market contracts, impartial justice, equal
rights, and indeed, we might add, political struggle itself." 39 However, cultural, relational
and postmodern feminism all take a somewhat different route to gendering the self. 40

for a subject to act in a manner contrary to her nature." See Elizabeth Grosz, "Sexual Difference and the
Problem of Essentialism," in The Essential Difference, eds. Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 84.
38

Feminist theorists have generally construed cultural feminism and relational feminism as one in
the same. Indeed, there are important overlaps between relational and cultural feminism, however, I will
make the distinction between the two. With regard to women's differences, relational feminism is more
closely linked to biological accounts, while cultural feminism is associated with social accounts for
explaining women's and men's differences.
39
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Sypnowich, 490.

Tue position held by traditional liberal feminist and "sameness" feminists, as indicated earlier,
wilJ not be discussed for obvious reasons.
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For the purpose of this analysis, by identifying and delineating the differences that
exist between feminist conceptions of the self, we will see which of these approaches
proves to be not only the most fruitful for feminists in gendering the self, but also which
approach proves to make best the claim that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine
subject.

Liberal Political Theory
Marked by a long and successful history, the liberal tradition has undergone
manifold transformations. Analogous to feminist theory, one finds across the terrain of
liberalism's development many diverse variants of the theory. While there is some vague
notion of liberty or freedom that appears to be threaded throughout all brands of
liberalism, a comprehensive definition of liberalism seems elusive. Inasmuch as no
single formulation of liberalism is inclusive of the spectrum of ideas present within the
liberal tradition, often what counts as "liberal" is a source of disagreement among liberals
themselves.
Nevertheless, despite the debate over what the definitive principles of liberalism
are, and the apparent lack of consensus among contemporary liberals, there are a set of
underlying assumptions-grounded on twin conceptions of the person and societywhich have allowed liberalism to remain "an integral outlook." 41

41

John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), xi.
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Drawing on several liberal theorists, I will roughly outline the foundational tenets
and assumptions found in contemporary liberalism. First, at the heart of contemporary
liberal theory is the belief that all persons should be equally regarded as individual
creatures of moral worth. It has followed from this that liberalism has been considered
"individualistic, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of
any social collectivity," and "egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same
moral status."42
The second assumption is that persons are beings who not only possess agency,
but also actively "seek the capacity for agency." 43 Liberal theorist Steven De Lue claims,
"persons wish to define their own goals, develop their own talents, interests, and needs,
and determine strategies for action that are effective means to attain self-determined
purposes. ,,44
Many liberal theorists, such as Rawls, have posited this assumption in terms of
"the good": the assumption is that all persons have "a conception of their good" and thus
want to lead a life that is good by pursuing their own self-defined vision of the good. 45
Moreover, the actions of persons, notes Bruce Ackerman, "cannot be understood apart

42

Ibid., x.
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Steven M. De Lue, "The Idea of a Duty to Justice in Ideal Liberal Theory," in Liberals on
Liberalism, ed. Alfonso J. Damico (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986), 97.
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1bid.
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from their conceptions of the good. " 46 One's conception of the good is in some fashion
constitutive of her identity.
The strategy with which we come to lead a good life is not a static process,
however. As persons capable of agency, we consider and may even revise our conception
of the good based on different experiences and access to information. These
"deliberations," notes Will Kymlicka, are not simply a method for determining the most
effective means for achieving our immediate goals, they are also "judgments about the
value of those ends and projects. and we recognize that our current or past judgments are
falli b1e."47
Third, in order for people to lead a life that is good, several preliminary factors
must be secured. As individuals, we must be willing to "lead our life from the inside, in
accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life." 48 In addition, the social
scheme must be able to secure the essential freedom and resources necessary "to question
those beliefs, to examine them in the light of whatever information and examples and
arguments our culture can provide. " 49 Thus, the social scheme must ensure equal liberty
for all persons to pursue their conceptions of the good as well as ensuring that "all
persons are provided the basic primary goods (such as rights and liberties, equality, self-
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As quoted by Richard E. Flathman, Towards a Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1989), 49.
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Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (New York: Clarendon Press, 1989), 11.
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respect, income and wealth) necessary for an agency-centered life." 50 (Of course, what
constitutes "equal liberty" and "basic primary goods" has been subject to wide
interpretation.)
This definition should not be considered an exhaustive one; rather my purpose is:
( 1) To provide a general framework of some of the defining features of liberalism in
which to situate the forthcoming analysis; (2) To highlight some of the foundational
assumptions that undergird Rawls's liberalism; and (3) To bring attention to the difficulty
of treating liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine (i.e., beyond a select set of
assumptions). As Kymlicka warns: "Different critics of 'the liberal tradition' are often
attacking different targets-some discussions are directed at the articulated premises or
specific liberal theorists, others at the habits and predispositions of liberal-minded
politicians and jurists, yet others at some more nebulous world-view which underlies
Western culture generally, not just our political tradition." 51 Heeding Kymlicka' s caveat,
my concern will be in evaluating feminist criticisms of Rawls's conception of the person
and determining whether their interpretation can correctly be attributed to his version of
liberalism.
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De Lue, 97.
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 9.
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John Rawls: A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism
As noted, the breadth of the liberal tradition is great, and Rawlsian liberalism is
simply one version among many. I submitted, however, that Rawls's Theory is of central
importance in contemporary liberalism given the fact that this has been the pole around
which liberals rally and the magnet of criticism for non-liberals. Accordingly, Rawls
presents one of the most representative versions of liberalism-the version of liberal
political theory from which I will mount my defense of liberal conceptions of the self
against feminist claims of gender bias.
In approaching Rawls's work, however, an important distinction must be drawn
between "justice as fairness" (hereafter referred to as JAF) and "political liberalism."
Since the publication of Theory, Rawls published a series of articles that later culminated
in the publication in 1993 of Political Liberalism. The significance of this book's
production is that it seemed to signal a partial departure by Rawls from JAF. While the
salience of this alteration is an open question, as Mulhall and Swift explain, "it is
sufficient to make the point that Rawls himself clearly regards the significant change as
that which now makes the theory a specifically political conception of justice, or a
specifically political brand of liberalism." 52 By emphasizing the political, Rawls has
attempted to shift JAF away from being considered a comprehensive moral doctrine
whose universalism transcends specific historical or cultural embodiments to a more
contextualized theory of justice. For our purposes, then, JAF will refer to Rawls's theory
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of justice as defined in Theory, and political liberalism will refer to the Rawls's later
work on JAF (i.e., JAF as a distinctly political theory of liberalism).

The Direction of Inquiry
The structure of this analysis is designed to address the question of whether
Rawls's conception of the self is defensible against feminist charges of gender bias. In
accordance with the stated purpose, then, the contents of the chapters are as follows. The
analysis begins in chapter two with an expository discussion of Rawls's conception of
justice as developed in Theory and in Political Liberalism. My purpose here is threefold.
In the first section, I will present a brief and elementary introduction of Rawls's project of
JAF as articulated in Theory. In the second section, I will draw out a list of themes that
both reflect Rawls's conception of persons, and also the issues that I will later focus upon
in discussing feminists' critiques of this notion. The third section will take up the themes
detailed in second section and review how these have been altered by Rawls's political
liberalism.
Next, chapter three will delineate specific feminist objections to the liberal
conception of the person. Having identified these contentions, chapter four and chapter
five will be devoted largely to evaluating the cogency of these critiques. In chapter four, I
will be concerned with evaluating whether feminists have correctly interpreted Rawls's
liberal notion of persons in either JAF or in political liberalism. In light of Rawls's shift
to political liberalism and his development of a new political conception of persons, I will
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evaluate whether Rawls's conception of persons in Theory or in Political Liberalism is
best able to counter feminists contentions.
In chapter five, I will be concerned with the success of feminists in gendering the
self, and whether they prevail in proving that Rawls's notion of the self is male or
masculine gendered. The issue of gendering the self is of chief importance for feminist
arguments directed at the Rawlsian self. If feminists are unable to articulate a set of
gender-based attributes (i.e., gender the self), they will necessarily lack the theoretical
tools neccesary for making the subsequent claim that the Rawlsian self is male or
masculine. I will conclude, then, by reviewing where feminists critiques have failed at
proving Rawls's conception of the self (as articulated in Theory or Political Liberalism)
is gender biased.

CHAPTER II
JOHN RAWLS'S CONCEPTION OF THE SELF:
FROM A THEORY OF JUSTICE TO POLITICAL LIBERALISM

As indicated in the previous chapter, the liberal conception of the self has figured
prominently in feminist contentions with-and rejections of-liberal political theory.
This chapter's aim is to review how the notion of persons is framed in Rawls' s liberal
conception of justice. Before turning to the task of explicating Rawls's conception of the
self, however, several issues ought to be addressed for the purpose of clarifying the
forthcoming exegesis.
The first issue of concern pertains to Rawls's presentation of the self in both
Theory and Political Liberalism. As students of liberal theory will have noted from the
outset, Rawls has emphatically disavowed any endorsement of a substantive account of
human beings in his conception of justice. His stated rejection of a comprehensive or
metaphysical portrayal of persons, unfortunately, makes an investigation of Rawls's
conception of the self a great deal more complicated. 53
53

Here it is important to clarify the use of the terms "metaphysical" and "comprehensive." Rawls
was initially concerned with not advancing any substantial metaphysical claims about persons in JAF.
Later, when Rawls began to develop his political conception of justice, and therein his political notion of
persons, he was not concerned with metaphysical claims, but rather with comprehensive claims about
persons. By the term "comprehensive" (as in a comprehensive doctrine about persons), In Political
Liberalism (59), Rawls states that: (1) it "covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of
human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner"; (2) "[i]t organizes and characterizes
recognized values so that they are compatible with one another and express an intelligible view of the
world"; and (3) "it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine". According to
Mulhall and Swift (177), the motive behind Rawls's switch "is that it is possible that even if the conception
of the person involved were not merely that of the person as citizen but did indeed involve a comprehensive
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Human beings are depicted by Rawls as rather elusive and shadowy figures in the
pages of both Theory and Political Liberalism. 54 Indeed at no point does Rawls
enumerate a comprehensive list of the essential qualities for conceiving of persons as
human beings. One is left to speculate whether Rawls has even offered a conception of
persons, or an interpretation of human nature, in his conception of justice. What is of
interest here is: (1) Why Rawls does not want to provide a substantive visions of persons,
and (2) Whether Rawls does in fact ascribe any characteristics or attributes to persons that
might in turn frame some rudimentary conception of persons.
For the most part, the answer to the first question lies with Rawls's attempt to
craft a liberal conception of justice capable of securing the fundamental rights of persons
as moral beings, with their own conception of the good life, while remaining neutral
between competing conceptions of the good. 55 In matters of persons pursuing their
conception of the good, Raw ls believes that the state should remain neutral in providing a
medium within which people can design, revise, and act upon their own vision of the

moral, philosophical or religious doctrine, such as a fundamental commitment to autonomy in all areas of
life, still this might not commit the advocate of the theory to any genuinely metaphysical claim, where the
term 'metaphysical' refers to an ontological claim about the essence of human beings".
54

In Political Liberalism, Rawls presents a more detailed (political) conception of persons, but
only in the sense that they are to be considered citizens in a particular political culture. That is to say, the
scope of Rawls's concept of persons is sharply restricted only to those exclusive political ideals, convictions
and conceptions implicitly shared by citizens in the "public political culture" of a democratic polity.
Beyond this political conception of persons as citizens, however, Rawls remains intentionally vague about
the nature of persons.
55

Kymlicka, in Liberalism, Community and Culture (96-97), interprets Rawls's notion of neutrality
to say "that governments cannot use as their justification for any action the fact that one person's way of life
is more or less worthy than another's [since] government neutrality is part of what it is to treat people as
equals."
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good. Moreover, the state should not institute or enforce its own conception of the
good.56
Had Raw ls offered a "thick" or plenary conception of the good-either for
persons or for persons via the community or the state, this would have resulted in two
unsatisfactory outcomes. 57 It would commit Rawls to a specifically metaphysical or
comprehensive account of persons, which would ultimately prove unattractive and
theoretically untenable. In addition, such a theory would fail to remain neutral in
tolerating different conceptions of the good. It seems clear then why Rawls has not
rendered a more elaborate version of a person's individual good-which would lead to a
"thick" conception of persons-in his theory of justice. To do so would not only call into
question the neutrality of, and therein the theoretical defensibility, of his liberal
conception of justice, but would also fail to take seriously persons as moral beings worthy
of respect. 58
This brings us to the latter question: I will demonstrate in this chapter that on a
close reading of Rawls's work one finds threaded throughout Theory a set of normative
claims that taken together compose a distinctly liberal conception of persons. In Political

56For an informative discussion on the liberal ideas of state neutrality and toleration of different
conceptions of the good, see the influential work of Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), especially chap. 4.

57The following points were similarly made by Thomas W. Pogge in Realizing Rawls (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 94-95.

58For a general, yet informative, discussion on the idea of regarding persons as "moral" beings and
the rational justification behind treating persons as creatures of respect, see S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, The
Principles of Political Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1959), chap. 2.
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Liberalism, Rawls takes a different tack in discussing personhood. Rawls formulates (or,

rather, extracts) a set of normative claims based not on his own liberal conception of
persons, but on an implicitly shared philosophical ideal among members of a democratic
society. Persons inhabiting a specific political sphere, contends Rawls, view themselves
as citizens with certain normative features in approaching matters of "political" justice. 59
Accordingly, Rawls is able to frame a set of normative conceptions on a distinctly
political conception of persons qua citizens, not on a metaphysical or comprehensive
conception of persons. 60
The second issue of concern is in reference to the semantic, and therein the
conceptual, problems that plague countless interpretations of Rawls's conception of
persons. Failure to recognize the subtle distinctions between "persons," "parties," and
"citizens," argues Rawls, has led many to misread his theoretical position on human
beings. For purposes of clarification in the forthcoming analysis, Rawls interprets each of
these concepts to embody a particular view in his conception of justice.
The notion of the person, explains Rawls, is used solely to capture the view "of
you and me"-it is the view "from which justice as fairness, and indeed any other

59

Note that I am using the term "political" justice, and not "social" justice here. In Political
Liberalism (38), Rawls writes, that "the conception of justice affirmed in a well-ordered democratic society
must be a conception limited to ... 'the domain of the political' and its values." Thus, Rawls's political
liberalism should be regarded as solely a conception of political justice and not a conception of social
justice which was the focus of JAF.
6

°Following Mulhall and Swift (passim), I will employ the terms "person qua citizen" to denote
Rawls's political conception of persons. In addition, when explicating Rawls's conception of persons as
explicated in Political Liberalism, the terms "citizen," "person qua citizen" and "political conception of
persons" will all be used interchangeably.
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political conception, is to be assessed." 61 The term "citizen" (employed in Political
Liberalism) represents a specifically political conception of persons. As Rawls points
out, the idea of the citizen is a normative (or more specifically a moral) conception, which
begins from our everyday conception of persons as the basic units of thought,
deliberation, and responsibility, and adapted to a political conception of justice
and not to a comprehensive doctrine. It is in effect a political conception of the
person, and given the aims of justice as fairness, a conception suitable for the
basis of democratic citizenship. 62
The view captured here is the way "you and I" think and understand ourselves as citizens
in the political sphere-not the private realm-as members of a constitutional democracy.
Lastly, the term "parties" is used in reference to a particular hypothetical construct
(i.e., the original position) that Rawls has modeled in his conception of justice. The
original position, purports Rawls, "is set up by you and me in working out justice as
fairness, and so the nature of the parties is up to us: they are merely the artificial
creatures inhabiting our device of representation." 63 The parties are to be considered
either the representatives of persons (as outlined in Theory) or of citizens (as defined in
Political Liberalism) in the original position, not in our veridical existence. Thus, the
view captured here is how "you and I" want to be represented in the original position for
the purpose of determining the fair and just way of distributing rights and duties. 64
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Having commented on the three ways persons are conceived in Rawls's projectthat is, as persons, as person qua citizens, as persons or citizens qua parties in the original
position-attention may now be devoted to the fundamental problem of interpretation.
For many critics of Theory, the original position seems to circumscribe a definitive set of
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of persons based on the characterization of the
parties in this hypothetical contract. 65 Rawls warns, however, that such a reading is
erroneous: "[T]he idea of the original position and the description of the parties may
tempt us to think that a metaphysical doctrine of the persons is presupposed ... [However,]
this interpretation is mistaken." 66
This points us to the crux of the problem when reviewing Rawls's conception of
the person. We must determine: (1) whether we should count attributes given to the
parties in the original position as characteristics of actual persons, contra Rawls's claims;
and (2) we must decide if there are any significant features that Rawls has accorded to
actual human beings outside of this original position.
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This problem of interpretation-that is, of ascribing characteristics of the parties to actual
persons-seems to be more symptomatic of the presentation of these concepts in Theory than in Political
Liberalism. In the later work, Rawls is much more careful in delineating and draw out the distinctions
between the concepts. As noted, Rawls attempts to distinguish "parties" in the original position from actual
persons. While at some points in the text this distinction between actual persons and parties (representing
persons) in the original position is lucid in Theory, at other moments it seems less obvious. This lack of
clarity on Rawls's part, I think, has in turn led many critics to wrongly assume that attributes given to the
parties are those given to human beings generally. Whether fault lies with Rawls convoluted account of
these two notions, or with critics "error" in misinterpreting these conceptions, is purely a speculative
matter. However, I am inclined to think that culpability resides with both parties in the debate.
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Following Allen Buchanan, I am inclined to think that it is prima facie "wrong to
extract Rawls' statements about the parties and read them as if they were his
generalizations about human beings." 67 However, we are similarly mistaken if we
presuppose that Rawls's conception of justice does not rest on some conception of
persons. The argument Mulhall and Swift adeptly make is that since Rawls's theory
explicitly embodies the claim that, when it comes to matters of justice, people
should be regarded as distinct from their particular natural endowments, social
positions and ends, but possessed of a highest-order interest in their capacity to
frame, revise and rationally pursue their conceptions of the good-such a claim
amounts to an assessment of what is important about people, [and] what
constitutes their well-being. 68
One finds underlying Rawls's conception of justice, then, a thin outline of a conception
of persons.
The third and final concern is Rawls's twin conceptions of the self: one as the
conception of persons in Theory, the other the political conception of persons as citizens
in Political Liberalism. Rawls's treatment of persons in Theory is presented in a manner
that is somewhat different from the conception delineated in his more recent publication,

Political Liberalism.
Since Rawls's conception of persons is embedded within the broader context of
his work, we must look at the trends within these writings to render intelligible why this
has culminated in two different, yet related, approaches to the self. Consonant with the
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opinions of other liberal theorists, Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit have detected two
philosophical trends within Rawls's writings since the publication of Theory. In the first
"movement," from 1971-1982, "Rawls offers a series of replies to objections, along with
some changes to and elaboration's of his theory of justice, which go to provide a deeper
understanding of the Kantian nature of his moral philosophy. " 69 In the second
"movement," from roughly 1982 to 1989, "Rawls forswears Kantianism and recasts his
philosophical enterprise as a political rather than a moral endeavor." 70
Recently, however, Rawls has labored to reconcile these two contrasting
philosophical movements under one coherent theory in Political Liberalism. 71 I will
assume, then, that this latest work by Rawls is the definitive statement of his newly
fashioned political conception of justice, political liberalism. More importantly, this
structural development in Rawls' s venture has yielded two different approaches to the
conception of justice by Rawls, which in turn has effected how the conception of the self
has been articulated in Theory and Political Liberalism. Recognizing this requires us to
treat these two conceptions separately in the exposition.
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With these preliminary remarks, we now may turn to the general outline of the
chapter. Having divided the chapter into two sections, the first part will present a brief
and general introduction to JAF as delineated in Theory. The purpose of this sketch is to
provide the necessary background in which to situate the discussion of Rawls's
conception of the self. With this orientation, I will tum to an exegesis of the Rawlsian
self by drawing out several themes and normative claims that underlie this conception.
The second section of the exposition will be devoted to Rawls's conception of persons as
delineated in Political Liberalism. In summation, the major theoretical contrasts between
the notion of the self developed in Theory and in Political Liberalism will be highlighted.

The Conception of Persons in A Theory of Justice
In Theory, the underlying purpose, for Rawls, was to articulate a set of moral
principles; that taken together would frame a conception of justice by which the
fundamental institutions of society could be regulated in a fair and just manner. 72 The
foremost question for us, then, is by what method are these principles of justice to be
chosen, and in what sense are these principles to be considered fair or just? To answer
these questions, we must briefly unpack the two main concepts that lie not only at the
heart of JAF, but also his conception of persons: the "original position" and the "veil of
ignorance."
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The original position is designed by Rawls as a hypothetical social contract-an
abstract and procedural model that frames an initial situation through which "parties" can
determine principles of justice. 73 When contemplating matters of social justice, we are to
envision what parties in the original position would agree to for the purpose of regulating
the "basic institutions" of society. In this way the original position provides both a
method for determining principles of justice and "an independent justificatory source." 74
The principles of justice-agreed to by parties in the original position-will be
just because the procedure itself is fair. 75 In other words, since the procedure is fair, the
principles agreed to by the parties will in tum be fair. This, Rawls notes, "explains the
propriety of the name 'justice as fairness': it conveys the idea that the principles of
justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair." 76
The question that follows, then, is what moral basis does Rawls have in
establishing the fair conditions to be embodied in the original position? In reply, Rawls
holds that the conditions fixed in the original position will presumably coalesce with our
intuitive moral judgments as to what would be considered a fair and just situation (as
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yielded in "reflective equilibrium"). 77 We would set certain limiting conditions on the
original position in order for the procedure to be considered fair.
This brings us to the second idea in JAF-the notion that parties in the original
position are to be situated behind a "veil of ignorance" for the purposes of rendering a fair
position. As a limiting condition, parties in the original position will not have access to
certain knowledge. Rawls outlines,
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status;
nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural asserts and abilities, his
intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his
conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the
special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to
optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the
particular circumstances of their own society .78
The aim of excluding these factors is to ( 1) rule out those "contingencies" that are
morally arbitrary with regard to choosing principles of justice; and (2) to nullify those
aspects that would set parties against each other. Left intact, these contingencies would
surely render any agreement in the original position unfair and thus unjust.
Beyond the above facts, however, Rawls does include the more general facts
about society and social life to parties in the original position. It is assumed that parties
77
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will "understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the
basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology." 79 This general
know ledge is allowed primarily in order to fit the principles of justice to the realities of
life, and therein the conditions that make a conception of justice necessary.
One more significant postulate is that parties in the original position would act in
a rational manner when selecting principles of justice. 80 With the above conditions taken
together-the exclusion of individual particularities, the inclusion of "general
information" of society, and the fact that parties are rational-Rawls believes he has
modeled a foundational situation in the original position that proves capable of yielding a
definitive conception of justice.
The two principles of justice that would herein be agreed to by the parties in the
original position are as follows. 81 The first principle-denoted The Greatest Equal
Liberty Principle-to be chosen by the parties orders that: "Each person is to have an
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equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all." 82
The second principle-labeled The Difference Principle and The Fair Equality of

Opportunity Principle-to be chosen by parties demands that: "Social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." 83
Though this account of Rawls's theory is selective and in no way an exhaustive
account of JAF, it sufficiently conveys the gist of Rawls's project. The rest of this section
is devoted to outlining those relevant themes that, in some sense, shape Rawls's
conception of persons. In drawing out the principal components that frame the Rawlsian
self, it should be noted that many of these concepts overlap extensively with other points
being canvassed. Nevertheless, the following sections cover what I take to be the ideas
significant in Rawls's conception of persons.

Moral Individualism
At the heart of Rawls's conception of persons, lies the commitment to a form of
methodological individualism. Following Kant's moral theory, Rawls's underlying
desideratum in JAF is to take seriously the idea of treating persons as creatures worthy of
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individual merit and respect in their own right. "To regard persons as ends in themselves
in the basic design of society," writes Rawls, "is to agree to forgo those gains which do
not contribute to their representative expectations." 84 Society, to some degree, endures
primarily for the welfare of individual persons; hence, the rights of individuals cannot be
prima f acie trumped simply for the good of the state, the community, or others. 85
This endorsement of individualism by Rawls is modeled into the conditions of the
original position. Rawls holds that in this position parties representing persons will "have
equal representation as moral persons who regard themselves as ends and the principles
they accept will be rationally designed to protect the claims of their person." 86 The
relevant point here is that Rawls regards individual persons as the rudimentary
determinant of analysis in choosing and adopting the principles of justice.
From the outset, this raises the issue of what we mean by the tenn
"individualism." We need a description of individualism that goes beyond the simple
claim that individuals are considered to be the theoretical core of JAF. A distinction
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between a metaphysical account of individualism and a moral account of individualism
would be beneficial. 87
On the one hand, a metaphysical account of individualism, has already, in some
sense, fixed the essential features of personhood and what the good of individuals entails.
On the other hand, moral individualism, explains Kukathas and Pettit, is a theory of
individualism that focuses only on how the institution of justice would be judged; that is,
"a socio-political arrangement ought to be judged, and only judged, by how it affects
individuals; it ought to be judged favorable for promoting the good of individuals [and]
unfavorably for not doing so." 88 Beyond this, moral individualism does not depend on or
endorse a specific good for individuals or make statements about their metaphysical
constitution.
Para11eling the description of moral individualism, the scope of JAF focuses only
on "socio-political arrangements" (i.e., "basic structure") of society. 89 Rawls's rationale
behind this focus is that he believes that this basic structure fundamentally affects a
person's chances in life-"what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to
do." 90 Thus, a conception of justice must be judged on account of how justly or fairly the
basic structure allocates primary rights and duties to individuals. 91
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Following Kukathas and Pettit, Rawls's individualism is best characterized as that
of a moral individualist, not a metaphysical individualist. 92 Rawls' s conception of justice
aims to treat persons (both men and women) as unique individual moral agents by taking
"seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals." 93 While Rawls is making a
normative claim to the extent that in matter's of social justice individuals wish to be
taken as the primary starting point (i.e., the rudimentary determinant of analysis), and the
ultimate standard by which to assess a conception of justice, he is not necessarily positing
a metaphysical account of individualism.

Social Context and Individuals
Rawls's individualism has raised a number of criticisms regarding the nature of
the relationship between individuals and society. The communitarian camp has advanced
the popular accusation that Rawls fails to recognize that persons are socially situated,
embedded creatures that depend on their social environment for personal identity and
conceptions of the good. 94
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Despite what communitarian objections may imply, Rawls does not deny the
importance of social contexts and society in his conception of justice. 95 Rawls has a
cardinal interest in society (and therein the primary institutions of this system) since it
forms the primary scope of his conception of justice. As understood in JAF, Rawls
discusses social factors in four significant ways.
In the first case, Rawls defines society as a cooperative enterprise between
individuals. Persons in society cooperate in their relations with one another by
acknowledging the fact that "certain rules of conduct [are] binding." 96 Thus, persons act
cooperatively when they show a willingness to act according to these publicly recognized
rules. While this explains how persons are supposed to act in a cooperative enterprise, it
does not demonstrate why persons in society would want to cooperate.
Accordingly, Rawls states that persons in society cooperate for their "mutual
advantage" because the principles of justice frames a set of "rules [which] specify a
system of cooperation [that is] designed to advance the good of those taking part in it." 97
Despite the myriad interests that drive persons apart in society, they nevertheless have a
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common interest in a society peopled with cooperative individuals. The reason, asserts
Rawls, is that "social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have
if each were to live solely by his own efforts." 98 Based on our mutual motivation for the
increased benefits of social cooperation, it is in the interest of individuals to band
together, according to the recognized rules and procedures of conduct, into a cooperative
social organization. In this way, Rawls's portrait of society is best viewed here as a
prudential or instrumental basis for society.
In the second case, Rawls recognizes the way in which society, and therein the
common social existence of its members, effects individuals when it comes to fashioning
their wants, needs, and identity. Rawls explains: "The social system shapes the wants
and aspirations that its citizens come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons
they want to be as well as the sort of persons they are." 99 The existing social system and
its basic institutions is able to reproduce and replicate itself because individuals have
formed a particular need or desire for the goods produced or secured by these institutions.
In the third case, Rawls presupposes that the character of human beings is inclined
towards sociability. Rawls does not want to establish the basis of human sociability on
the fact that we have the capacity-as persons sharing a common social life-for
developing a common language and culture which allows us to express our wants, beliefs,
desires, thoughts, and so on. This proves to be a weak and "trivial interpretation of
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human sociability" according to Rawls. 100 Rather, Rawls grounds sociability on the
"three psychological laws" that are requisite for developing a sense of justice.

101

Rawls

states that having the "capacity for a sense of justice ... would appear to be a condition of
human sociability." 102 Given that Rawls presupposes that persons have this moral power
(as will be discussed in the forthcoming section), one can conversely assume that one
aspect requisite for human sociability is attained.
The other condition underlying Rawls's conception of human sociability is
founded on peoples' natural desire to form, join, and partake in the activities of "social
unions." That is. Rawls associates persons' propensity for sociability with their natural
desire to form social unions with people having similar goals and ends in order to pursue
their visions of the good jointly. As participants in a social union laboring towards a
shared common end, we derive a sense of gratification and regalement that one could not
achieve hermetically. Humans form social unions, explains Rawls, because "[ w ]e need
one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the
success and enjoyment of others are necessary for and complimentary to our own
good." 103 Since pursuing our vision of the good life is intricately bound up with other
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member's engaged in commensurate activities, it follows for Rawls then that individuals
have a natural affinity for the "tie of community." 104
Having introduced the notion of social union, carries us then to our fourth and
final point: Rawls's maintains that society, and therein social life, should be regarded as
good in themselves; or, rather, society should be viewed as a shared common good. 105
(On this account, it seems as though Rawls is tempering his earlier instrumentalists
account of society.)
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Akin to participants in smaller social unions, members in the social union of a "wellordered society (corresponding to justice as fairness)" also have "shared final ends and
they value their common institutions and activities as good in themselves." 108 It is in this
"sentimental" sense society is recognized as a common good. 109
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Equality and Moral Personality
For Rawls, the actual "state of nature" is a situation rife with inequalities of all
persuasions. People do not associate with one other on a level basis due to nature's
inequitable distribution of physical powers, mental capabilities, natural talents, resources,
and so on among persons. 110 Given that this inequitable distribution is vagarious and
arbitrary, in the sense that inequalities are allocated by sheer luck, it follows for Rawls
that these personal attributes are to be considered "morally" arbitrary. Individuals ought
to receive equal consideration in matters of social justice, irrespective of whether they
have fared well or ill in nature's cosmic lottery.
Two implicit assumptions are being made by Rawls here: ( 1) that persons ought
to be regarded as morally equal in thinking about social justice; and (2) that persons ought
not to benefit from undeserved attributes and talents gained through chance. Rawls
contends that these assumptions, which are constituted in the depiction of the original
position, for the most part, capture our intuitive or moral judgments. We would accede to
supporting the condition of equality in the original position, because when thinking about
social justice, we believe persons, as moral beings worthy of respect, ought to have equal
consideration in detennining the principles of justice.
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Rawls places the parties behind the veil of ignorance in the original position so
that they will not be rewarded for morally arbitrary attributes. If parties are not
"advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies", then they can each
deliberate from a position of equal liberty whereby parties can freely choose the
principles of justice. 111 Thus, Rawls's motive in situating parties behind a veil of
ignorance then is to exemplify equality between persons as moral beings.
In conjunction with the intuitive argument, much of Rawls's attempt to provide a
theoretical justification for this equality hinges on his account of "moral personality."
Moral personality, claims Rawls, consists of two moral powers or "natural attributes" that
human beings are assumed to possess, which in turn provides the "natural basis of
equality." 112 First, Rawls states that we "are capable of having (and are assumed to have)
a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life)." 113 Second, Rawls
states that we "are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, at
least to a certain minimum degree."
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The idea that equality should be based on the possessorship of these natural
attributes to a minimal degree (whether manifest or latent), leads to an immediate
question. How will a standard by which "a minimum degree" of moral personality be
fixed, without invoking a basis for equality that is exclusionary? According to Rawls,
All we have to do is to select a range property (as I will say) and to give equal
justice to those meeting its conditions ... [W]hether there is a suitable range
property for singling out the respect in which human beings are to be counted
equal is settled by the conception of justice. But the description of the parties in
the original position identifies such a property, and the principles of justice assure
us that any variations in ability within the range are to be regarded as any other
natural asset. There is no obstacle to thinking that a natural capacity constitutes
the basis of equality. 115
Accordingly, an acceptable range parameter can be set so that it comprehensively
encompasses all human beings and thus they can all be eligible for equal consideration.
The minimal standard of moral personality thus provides the theoretical justification
requisite for regarding persons, in matters of social justice, as individuals with "a distinct
claim to equal consideration." 116
Above we find Rawls making several normative claims about the nature of human
beings: ( l) persons are capable of having, and indeed are assumed to have, a conception
of their good; (2) persons are both capable of, and do have, a sense of justice; (3) persons
ought to be considered morally equal; (4) equal consideration of persons ought not be
based on morally arbitrary characteristics. Unlike the first two descriptive based claims
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(i.e., as an attribute of persons per se), the latter two claims are normative in the sense
that he is claiming how persons "ought to be treated alike."

117

Conceptions of the Good, Rational Plans, and Conflicting Interests
As outline in the foregoing section, Rawls assumes that persons have "an identity
of interests" which informs their conception of the good or "plan of life." 118
Correspondingly, individuals will be inclined to pursue and affirm a wide range of
diverse goals, lifestyles, projects, values, and so on. The relevant point here is that Rawls
makes the normative assumption that persons have a conception of their good, and that by
extension they have a stake in making claims on the basic structure of society for the
purpose of facilitating their attainment of the good life.
Rawls takes up this assumption in modeling the sort of claims to be advanced in
the original position. Though parties are considered to be behind the veil of ignorance,
they will be cognizant of the fact that they have a conception of the good which
comprises their life plan, and that it will be in their interest to advance this conception.
Given that this is the case, Rawls lists two additional attributes that parties in the original
position will be ascribed. First, in pursing their conception of the good, selecting the
range of primary goods, and in choosing the principles of justice, parties are to be
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considered rational. Second, due to the factors requiring justice, Rawls states that parties
must also be considered rationally disinterested.
To elaborate on the first point: Rawls maintains that behind the veil of ignorance
parties "know that they have some rational plan of life." 119 What does being rational
entail for Rawls? The answer is that Rawls's notion of rationality is grounded in a type of
rational choice theory, which is, in part, the kind of rationality on display in Kant's
hypothetical imperative (that "directs us to take certain steps as effective means to
achieve a specific end"). 120 Rational participants in the original position, posits Rawls,
will: (I) establish "a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him"; (2)
"[rank] these options according to how well they further his purposes"; and, (3) "follow
the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater
chance of being successfully executed." 121
Because these tenets of rational choice at times fail to rationally order the long
term plans of parties, Rawls introduces a supplemental conception of rationality-that is,
"'deliberative rationality"-to augment the basic (short-term) conception of rational
choice. By deliberative rationality, Rawls means that rational persons can work through,
by way of self-reflection and self-critique, various options in order to determine which
one is in the long run their best interest. It is assumed then by Rawls that a participant in
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the original position: ( 1) knows "the general features of his wants and ends both present
and future"; (2) can approximate "the relative intensity of his desires, and to decide if
necessary what he really wants"; (3) will "envisage the alternatives open to them and
establish a coherent ordering of them"; and lastly, (4) after a plan is decided, participants
are "able to adhere to it and ... resist present temptations and distraction that interfere with
its execution." 122 Taken together, these cognate notions of rationality highlight Rawls's
conception of parties as participants capable of rational decision-making in the original
position.
This brings us to the discussion of conflicting interests and therein the need for a
condition of rational disinterest to be modeled in the original position. To begin, Rawls
presumes that within society there inheres a set of descriptive or empirical conditions that
together necessitate a conception of justice. Rawls has divided these "circumstances of
justice" into "subjective" and "objective" factors. The objective determinants create "a
condition of moderate scarcity" in society. 123 This condition generates conflicts among
persons because, as Rawls explains, they "are not indifferent as to how the greater
benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends
they each prefer a larger to a lesser share." 124
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The subjective factors relate to person's intellectual propensities for exacerbating
conflict. Since it is a natural circumstance that there will be a melange of religious,
philosophical, economic, political, and social doctrines affirmed by individuals, there will
necessarily be discord between these individuals as each attempts to advance claims
against the scarce resources in society. Sharpening this tension, human beings also
"suffer from various shortcomings of knowledge, thought, and judgment" merely because
it is a "natural situation." 125
These circumstances of justice-the condition of moderate scarcity and the
conflict between persons over visions of the good-have led Rawls's to hold that the
proper motivation behind parties in the original position should be that of "mutual
disinterest.'~

Parties will be neither envious, revengeful, or interested in assisting other

participants conception of the good. The interests of parties in the original position,
declares Rawls, "are in himself, not merely, as they must always be, interests of a self. 126
At first glance, the tenant of mutual disinterest seems to be an odd way to
conceive of parties in the original position as it implies that parties are egoisticinterested only in themselves-and that they cannot be motivated "by benevolence, or an
interest in one another's interests." 127 On this point, Rawls contends that mutual
disinterest does not collapse into egoism, as "Schopenhauer thought of Kant's
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doctrine." 128 Remember that the life plans of the parties are not interests "in a self'; they
are interests "of a self that regards its conception of the good as worthy of recognition and
that advances claims in its behalf as deserving satisfaction." 129 As rightly understood by
Buchanan, parties do not know "whether these conceptions [of the good] tum out to be
egoistic, altruistic, or something in between [because it is] shielded from them by the veil
of ignorance." 130
Though parties are mutually disinterested in the original position, Rawls is not by
extension claiming that actual persons are not motivated by the web of personal
relationships (evoking strong and sincere emotions for others) that often comprise social
life. 131 "'[O]nce the veil of ignorance is removed, the parties find that they have ties of
sentiment and affection, and want to advance the interests of others and to see their ends
attained." 132 It is only when thinking about matters of justice that parties, cloaked behind
the veil of ignorance, that the bonds of personal ties become opaque.

Freedom, Liberty and Autonomy
Like the normative claim of equality, Rawls similarly affirms that we ought to
consider persons morally free. This claim, however, immediately raises the question of
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what Rawls intends by this concept of freedom. 133 First and foremost, Rawls assumes
that persons are free in the sense that they have a free will; their fate is not predetermined
by some cosmic order of things. Thus, persons have the capacity to make intentional
choices in life and can in turn be held accountable for these choices.
Second, Rawls notion of freedom is that of a political ideal. In the words of Isaiah
Berlin, political freedom (in the negative sense of the word) is "the area within which a
man can act unobstructed by others." 134 For Rawls, like Berlin, the notions of political
liberty and freedom overlap in meaning. Rawls poses that "liberty can always be
explained by a reference to three items: the agents who are free, the restriction or
limitations which they are free from, and what it is that they are free to do or not to
do." 135 It is these two accounts of freedom-as freedom of the will and as the political
ideal of liberty-that are employed by Rawls in JAF.
The original position is modeled by Rawls to frame a conception of justice that
fits with the conception of persons as free agents (and will also yield a principle of
freedom as a political idea in "justice as fairness"). 136 If we take parties in the original
position as participants freely pursuing their conceptions of the good, whatever that might
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be, it follows for Rawls that these individuals will necessarily consider liberty the primary
social good requisite for executing their life plans. The "highest-order interest," for both
the parties in the original position and persons in general, claims Rawls, is "in preserving
one's freedom to revise one's ends, and hence in choosing institutions that will shape our
ends."137
This right to freedom, via principles of JAF, is correspondingly a right to
autonomy, which Rawls considers important in parties choosing principles of justice and
in persons exercising their agency. 138 The notion of autonomy employed by Rawls is
applicable to two positions in JAF: the original position and actual society. In the first
case, the conditions in the original position are set up so that parties, being free and equal,
can act autonomously in choosing principles of justice. The second case applies to
persons acting autonomously once principles of justice have been chosen. When actual
persons conduct themselves in a manner consistent with principles delineated in JAF
"they are acting from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best
express their nature as free and equal rational beings." 139 In other words, they are able to
act autonomously under this conception of justice.
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language and articulation in the process of deliberation." See Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues:
Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford, MA: Clarendon Press, 1991 ),
216.
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The Conception of Persons in Political Liberalism
Since the publication of Theory, Rawls has made several modifications to his
original conception of justice, JAF. Broadly speaking, Rawls's revisions should be
viewed as a shift in emphasis from what Rawls has called a "comprehensive
philosophical doctrine" (as delineated in Theory) to that of a specifically political
conception of justice (as laid out in Political Liberalism).
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The principal motivation inspiring Rawls to make this philosophical shift was for
the purpose of remedying what he believed to be the theoretical flaws and inconsistencies
plaguing JAF. 141 One should accordingly regard this latest statement of justice as fairness
in Political Liberalism, then, as a revision and further evolution of Rawls's original
conception of justice. Aside from the emendations made in Political Liberalism, Rawls
maintains that "the structure and content of Theory [are] to remain substantially the
same."142
The question of interest then is what are the key points in which justice as fairness
should now be regarded as strictly a political conception of justice? To answer, there are
three fundamental ways in which justice as fairness should be considered a political
conception. In the first case, the application of political liberalism, as a conception of
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justice, is to be narrower in scope than in JAF: that is, it applies only to "the domain of
the political."143
Here two points should be made plain. First, Rawls only intends the principles of
justice to apply to "political" (including the primary public, social and economic)
institutions. Private (social) institutions in society-such as families, companies, clubs,
associations, communities, and the like-are not the proper subject of political
liberalism. 144 Rawls holds that these institutions fall beyond the purview of political
justice. 145 The second point is that the political institutions Rawls is referencing are only
those of a constitutional democracy, and not just any ideological regime.
The second respect in which justice as fairness should be considered political is
that it should be understood as a "freestanding" political conception of justice: it is not
"presented as" or "derived from" any one comprehensive moral doctrine, rather it stands
independent of such doctrines.

146

Rawls explains that citizens in a democratic society,

through an "overlapping consensus" of comprehensive doctrines, can construct a
mutually agreeable conception of political justice.
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This overlapping consensus,
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summarizes Rawls, "develops the principles of justice from public and shared ideas of
society as a fair system of cooperation and of citizens as free and equal by using the
principles of their common practical reason." 148
The last way in which justice as fairness is to be considered a political conception
is that its content is formulated in terms derived from the fundamental political ideas
implicit in the "background culture" of a democratic society (which is constituted by a
plethora of various conceptions of the good, comprehensive moral doctrines, ethos of
private institutions, and so on).

149

Drawing on those intuitive notions and ideas

embedded in the fabric of our social life-those historical traditions and shared social
conceptions implicit in our view of the basic structures of society-justice as fairness
aims to systematically articulate a coherent matrix of shared political values for the
purpose of framing a conception of justice.
Having made these brief points concerning political liberalism, I will now discuss
Rawls' s political conception of persons. It is important to remember the differences
sketched earlier between human beings, citizens (in a specific political society), and
parties (acting as representatives of citizens in the original position). Rawls pays little
attention to the notion of human beings and their nature in political liberalism, except to
suggest that those attributes of human nature that we deem significant are contingent
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upon on our point of view . 150 Thus, Rawls is concerned only with one aspect of
personhood given the aim of justice as fairness: persons qua citizens within a
constitutional democracy. The scope of this conception, Mulhall and Swift explain,
"applies only to the person insofar as she is an inhabitant of the public political realm and
not to any other aspect of her life." 151 Rawls intends only to speak about persons-that
is, as citizens-in this very limited sense.

Moral Individualism
As in JAF, Rawls continues to emphasize the primacy of the individual in matters
of justice. This is demonstrated by his continued use of individuals (whether it be as
actual persons, as persons qua citizens, or as parties in the original position ) as the
primary unit of analysis and the standard by which to judge the "justness" of a theory of
justice.
In Political Liberalism, however, it seems Rawls has tempered-or perhaps
further clarified-his earlier position on moral individualism. 152 ·This modification (or
attempt to qualify his moral individualism) has been made in three ways.

150Ibid., 18.
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0ne can further speculate that this subtle move was intended to cut short the prevalent criticism
that JAF subscribed to a metaphysical account of individualism. On this point, Rawls notes, in Political
Liberalism (196), that Thomas Nagel was one of the theorists that has attempted to demonstrate that his
"well-ordered society of justice as fairness has a strong individualistic bias." Accordingly, it seems that
Rawls has set out to diffuse some of the more polarized versions of this claim.
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First, by contending that rights do not only apply to individuals, but to (private)
groups as well, Rawls seems to have widen his initial focus. On this matter, Rawls states
that "[i]t is incorrect to say that liberalism focuses solely on the rights of individuals;
rather, the rights it recognizes are to protect associations, smaller groups, and individuals,
all from one another in an appropriate balance specified by its guiding principles of
justice." 153 One can infer then that Rawls is implying that associations and groups also
. become standards, like individual citizens, by which to judge the fairness of theories of
justice. In addition, by acknowledging the rights of groups, Rawls is in tum recognizing
the importance of community and associations for individuals in society.
Second, Rawls claims that the moral individualism underlying justice as fairness
is based on our shared political conception of persons: that is, our conception of persons
qua citizens is an idea implicit in our shared public political culture. As inhabitants of a

constitutional democracy, Rawls contends, our political conception of persons is "one
that begins from our everyday conception of persons as the basic units of thought,
deliberation, and responsibility." 154 In this sense, individualism-that is, the idea that as
citizens we should be treated as distinct and individual beings-is to be regarded as a
publicly shared political value that all members of the society hold when it comes to
thinking about ourselves as citizens.
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Third, because "justice as fairness itself is a political conception of justice," Rawls
posits that it escapes "a strong individualistic bias." 155 The individualism underlying
justice as fairness is not based on any brand of metaphysical or comprehensive moral
doctrine; rather, it is a feature latent within our own political and social culture. 156 The
normative claim that we ought to treat citizens as distinct individuals in matters of justice,
is an ideal derived from our shared social life which all citizens within a democratic
society can agree upon. Not only does this notion of individualism indubitably place the
importance of social context at the center of this conception of justice, it renders moot
some of the criticisms that alleged justice as fairness was based on a form of metaphysical
individualism.
Though Rawls has recast the theoretical underpinnings of individualism from the
sort of normative claim implicitly made in JAF, his commitment to the idea of
individualism (as a normative claim) in political liberalism remains intact.

Individuals and Social Context
One of the chief aims of Raw ls' s political conception of justice was to situate
justice as fairness within a particular social and political context. By doing so, Rawls
accounts for the way in which our formal conception of justice depends upon and is
framed by our implicitly shared political values constituted by our shared social life. We
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must consider, then, "the principles of justice as designed to form the social world in
which our character and our conception of ourselves as persons, as well as our
comprehensive ties and their conception of the good, are first acquired, and in which our
moral powers must be realized, if theory are to be realized at all." 157
Justice as fairness is not to be viewed as a "foreign" conception to be mapped on
to just any political society; it is a conception constituted by the implicitly shared notions
of citizens embedded within a constitutional democracy. On this account, society for
these citizens is viewed not only as "fair system of cooperation over time", but also as the
"fundamental organizing idea of justice as fairness, within which the other basic ideas are
systematically connected." 158
In order for society to be considered a fair system of cooperation, Rawls outlines
three requisite conditions that must be in place. The political system is fair if the publicly
acknow I edged principles of justice are those that citizens follow and form their actions to
be consistent with the conception of justice that citizens agreed were fair. 159 Fair social
cooperation involves reciprocity, which "lies between the idea of impartiality, which is
altruistic (as moved by the general good), and the idea of mutual advantage understood as
everyone's being advantaged with respect to one's present or expected situation as things
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are." 16 Citizens must coexist with other citizens who are equally willing to abide by the
fair rules and procedures of a "well-ordered democratic society."
One final ingredient remains in order to make the idea of social cooperation both a
necessary and plausible conception: individuals and groups must have a sense of their
conception of the good. This "specifies what those who are engaged in cooperation ... are
trying to achieve, when the scheme is viewed from their own standpoint." 161 If citizen's
did not have a conception of their good-that is, if they did not want to make claims
against society in pursuing their vision of the good life, then, there would be no need for a
fair system of cooperation.
Rawls claims that society as a fair system of cooperation is a good in itself based
on a shared common end. In "supporting just institutions and of giving one another
justice accordingly, not to mention many other ends they must also share and realize
through their political arrangements," citizens are provided with a shared common end. 162
In short, "the good realized is social: it is realized through citizens' joint activity in
mutual dependence on the appropriate actions being taken by others." 163
A well-ordered society is not only presented as a good for citizens as a group,
observes Rawls, it is also good for individual citizens for two specific reasons. Society is
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good for citizens in that it allows them the requisite freedom to utilize their moral powers,
and this venture is deemed in itself a good thing. Another reason is that by fairly
allocating the primary political goods necessary for exercising their moral powers, this
has given citizens a private base for self-respect. 164 The distribution of primary goods,
based on the political conception that citizens are free and equal, amounts to an
acknowledgment in a public forum that all citizens have an equal status, and must be
treated accordingly.

Equality and Moral Personality
This discussion on equality in political liberalism is similar to that in JAF,
however, two substantial differences should be noted. The first dissimilarity is that
Rawls is referring to citizen's as being morally equal, not a conception of persons as
presented in J AF. In this respect, citizens are to be counted as morally equal by virtue of
the fact that as members in a democratic society they regard themselves as equal when
deliberating over issues of political justice.
Akin to the description given to persons in JAF, Rawls also claims that citizens
are to be regarded as equal because they possess certain moral powers which, taken
together, constitute a citizen's moral personality. Citizens must have a sense of justice"the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice
which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation"-and they must have a

I 641bid.,

203.

65

"determinate" conception of their good which they would rationally act upon in order to
achieve their ends as d~fined by their good. 165 (As an addendum to JAF, Rawls assumes
that citizens possess the above capacities throughout their lives.)
This moral propensity, Rawls notes, should in no way be regarded as a physical or
psychological attribute of human beings based on a form of biological determinism or
universal interpretation of human nature. Rather it should be regarded as a philosophical
conception constituted by "a scheme of concepts and principles for expressing a certain
political conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship." 166
The primary differences in the conception of equality from JAF to political
liberalism is that we should regard persons qua citizens as morally equal based upon our
public political culture. And, that moral personality should be considered a philosophical
concept, or a political ideal.

Conceptions of the Good, Rational Plans, and Conflicting Interests
Rawls assumes that citizens in a democratic society have a conception of their
own good. What is good is that which
normally consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends
we want to realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and
loyalties to various groups and associations. These attachments and loyalties to
various groups and associations who are the objects of these sentiments is also
part of our conception of the good. We also connect with such a conception of a
view of our relation to the world-religious, philosophical, and moral-by
reference to which the value and significance of our ends and attachments are
I65Ibid., 19.
166
Ibid., 86-87.
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understood. Finally, persons' conceptions of the good are not fixed but form and
develop as they mature, and may change more or less radically over the course of
life.167

The significant difference between this account of the good and that given in JAF is that
here Rawls draws more attention to the personal attachments of citizens to other
individuals and to associations in the framing their conception of the good.
As in JAF, Rawls presupposes that these citizens are rational in their pursuit of
their life plan. However, in political liberalism, this notion of rationality is better
articulated. Rawls introduces a distinction between citizens being "reasonable" and being
"rational." 168
Reasonableness is how citizens are expected to interact, according to their sense
of justice, with other members in political society. It is evidenced by the
acknowledgment of citizens to bear the burdens of responsibilities and "willingness to
propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them provided others do." 169
What is rational applies to (I) "a single, unified agent (either an individual or
corporate person) with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and
interests peculiarly its own"; (2) the way "these ends and interests are adapted and
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affirmed, as well as to how they are given priority"; and (3) "the choice of means, in
which case it is built by such familiar principles as: to adopt the most effective means to
ends, or to select the more probable alternative, other things equal." 170
Analogous to JAF, Rawls assumes that citizens in a democratic society will have a
maelstrom of conflicting interests. Rawls moves beyond the discussion in JAF, however,
in affirming that at the heart of political liberalism lies the presupposition that pluralism
is an endemic and "permanent feature of the public culture of democracy." 171 It is a
enduring feature given "the political and social conditions secured by the basic rights and
liberties of free institutions," explains Rawls. 172 With reasonable pluralism-that is,
there exists an irreducible plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good-and conflict
as endemic features of democratic society, the political stage, and therein the task, for
political liberalism is set: justice as fairness is given the monumental task of achieving
reasonable "unity and stability" within a political society, whose inclinations are always
teetering towards the brink of anarchical dissent. 173
In conclusion, the notion of the good, rationality, and conflict have all received a
recasting in political liberalism. Rawls has expanded the notion of the good to
encompass the meaningful personal and communal attachments that seemed to be
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marginalized in JAF's account of a person's good. With respect to rationality, Rawls
made the necessary theoretical distinctions that seemed only implicit in JAF. Lastly, the
idea of conflict in society, or pluralism of interests, based on long-standing operation of a
democratic regime was the most marked divergence from JAF.

Freedom, Liberty and Autonomy
Rawls states that citizens should be considered morally free by virtue of the fact
that they view themselves as such. Citizen's should be regarded as free in three respects.
First, they are capable of exercising their will in freely choosing their life plans. Second,
citizens consider themselves free in the sense that they are "self-authenticating sources of
valid claims." 174 That is to say, citizens "regard themselves as being entitled to make
claims on their institutions so as to advance their conceptions of the good (provided these
conceptions fall within the range permitted by the public conception of justice)." 175
Lastly, citizens are seen as free because "they are viewed as capable of taking
responsibility for their ends and this affects how their various claims are assessed." 176
Because citizens are free in these ways, they are also considered both "rationally"
and "fully" autonomous. Citizens are rationally autonomous because they have the
capacity to create, revise, and act upon the their conceptions of the good. Rawls models
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this conception in the original position so that parties, as citizen representatives, will act
autonomously when deliberating over the principles of justice.
Just as citizens are rationally autonomous in two ways-they are free within the
limits of political justice to pursue their permissible conceptions of the good; and
they are motivated to secure their higher-order interest associated with their moral
power-so the parties are rationally autonomous in two ways: they are free within
the constraints of the original position to agree to whatever principles of justice
they think most to the advantage of those they represent; and in estimating this
advantage they consider those persons' higher-order interests. 177
Full autonomy, in contrast to rational autonomy, cannot be modeled in the original
position. "[F]ull autonomy is [only] realized by citizens," claims Rawls, "when they act
from principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give to
themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons." 178 Thus citizens exercise
full autonomy by acting according to principles of justice as fairness in their pursuit of the
good life.
Contrasted with JAF, Rawls has posited that citizen's are morally free based on
their own perception of themselves as citizens. As revealed by the public political culture
of a democratic society, political liberty is esteemed as the primary social good given
citizen's conception of themselves as free beings. While the concept of autonomy was
analogous to the idea delineated in JAF, Rawls provided a more lucid treatment of the
idea in political liberalism.
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Conclusion
Recall from chapter one the discussion from liberal political theory. In reviewing
Rawls conception of persons in Theory and in Political Liberalism, it seems as though we
find a similar set of normative assumptions outlined by Rawls. In Theory, he assumes
that persons ought to be treated as morally equal and free individuals who have the
capacity for a conception of the good with a complementary desire for the requisite liberty
to pursue their life plans. While these conceptions outline a more individualistic account
of persons, let us not forget Rawls's normative assumption in JAF that persons are indeed
social creatures. Having outlined the normative features of the Rawlsian self modeled in
the original position, it has been demonstrated that JAF is framed around a distinctly
liberal conception of persons.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls posits a similar set of assumptions about persons
(with some minor exceptions); however, he has substantially altered the source and
characterization of the former claims delineated in Theory. These normative assumptions
are derived from implicitly shared political values generated by our public political
culture and should be observed as a philosophical ideal concerning how persons regard
themselves as citizens. Rawls's political liberalism in turn endorses a liberal conception
of persons only to the extent that as citizens in a democratic society we publicly support
the liberal "ideal of democratic citizenship." 179
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This move by Rawls from defending a conception of persons to a political
conception of persons qua citizens has been significant for one cardinal reason. Since
Rawls has mapped all of the normative assumptions sketched in Theory on to a political
conception of persons as citizens, he avoids one of the primary shortcomings-namely, of
invoking a metaphysical or comprehensive account of persons-of JAF. Thus, Rawls's
political conception of justice as fairness, by and large, leaves the notion of actual person
free from theoretically damaging normative entanglements.

CHAPTER III
THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF RAWLS'S CONCEPTION OF THE SELF

Given the matrix of substantive and normative claims Rawls has ascribed to
persons in his theory of justice, feminists have concluded that the Rawlsian self is a
gender-biased conception. The Rawlsian self, assert feminists, entails certain
metaphysical, ontological and epistemological assumptions that when taken together
reveal a figure which is distinctively '·male" or "masculine." 180
The aim of this chapter is to sketch out some of the principal allegations which
have led feminists to make the above conclusion. In rendering a general account of
feminist contentions with Rawls's conception of the self, this exegesis will necessarily be
selective. I have favored only those feminist critiques that are most representative of this
body of criticism. 181 In addition, the material is not drawn from a single group of
feminists, but rather from a myriad of feminist theorists. 182
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Before moving to the task of unpacking specific critiques of the Rawlsian self, the
provision of a framework for purposes of illuminating both the nature and direction of
feminists' allegations would be prudent. To begin, regardless of whether contentions
were formulated by cultural, relational, or postmodern feminists, for the most part, one
finds three broad types of arguments launched against the Rawlsian self.
The first argument feminists' advance alleges that Rawls's conception of the self
is a metaphysical construct, with metaphysical attributes that are distinctly male or
masculine in orientation. The second argument is that Rawls's conception of the self
exists ontologically prior to its ends and social context. For feminists, this notion of the
"separate" self is more consistent with male or masculine conceptions of the self than
with female or feminine "relational" selves. The third argument is directed at Rawls's
epistemology. Here feminists claim that Rawls employs a distinctively male or masculine
conception of rationality. While each of the aforementioned arguments target a different
perceived weakness of the Rawlsian self, they are all inspired by a shared belief: certain
features of the Rawlsian self can be identified as embodying male or masculine attributes.
This belief raises two important questions. First, what basis do feminists have for
fashioning such a claim? Second, what characteristics do feminists consider distinctly
female or feminine as opposed to characteristics that are male or masculine? In reference
to the first question, the chief route feminists have taken in substantiating their claims has

fit neatly together into a coherent and comprehensive critique. Different feminists have to some degree
focused their critiques on different aspects of Rawls's conception of the self.
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come in the form of a descriptive-type argument. By this I mean that feminists have
generated two catalogs of gender attributes, one that is male or masculine and a another
that is female or feminine. Feminists have used this catalog of descriptions to judge
whether Rawls's interpretation of the self is one that is embodied with male or masculine
attributes.
Regardless of whether feminists have employed a socio-historical or cultural
account of gender-identity construction or a psychological or psychoanalytic account of
gender-identity construction, both have come to the same conclusion: a woman's sense of
self is relational. Women consider themselves connected to others by way of a web of
intimate and personal attachments which are not only constitutive of women's' identity,
but also influence the way in which women act and reason from a relational perspective.
In contrast to this vision of the relational self, feminists have interpreted the
Rawlsian self-an alleged concatenation of male or masculine attributes-as an
exceedingly ''autonomous, independent, individualistic, and [impartially] rational"
creature. 183 Moreover, feminists claim that Rawls's separate self is asocial, detached, and
self-interested individual.
In overviewing the nature of feminist allegations, the examination will now look
specifically at feminists' critiques of Rawls' s conception of the self. In the interest of
consistency and continuity with the design of the preceding chapter, I have roughly
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organized feminists' arguments under the headings set forth in the last chapter: moral
individualism, social context and individuals, and so on.

Moral Individualism

It was stated in chapter two that Rawls subscribes to a fonn of moral
individualism, which is inextricably tied to the belief that individuals ought to be treated:
( 1) as beings of incomparable worth; (2) as the primary locus of analysis; and (3) as the
ultimate standard by which to judge the fairness of his theory of justice.
According to feminists (and other critics), this first-order moral assertion
necessarily invokes a metaphysical view of human beings. To explain, Rawls's "ethical
view of the locus of human worth presupposes in tum a particular second-order theory of
the self and its constitution ... ; it presupposes a foundational account of the person." 184
Feminists have formulated their claim of metaphysics in one of two ways. 185 The
first and most common argument feminists make to uphold their allegation of
metaphysics is presented as a historical fact, one endemic to all liberal theories of justice.
The argument ordinarily runs as follows: since liberal theorists have historically
subscribed to a metaphysical conception of persons, and given the fact that Rawls's
theory of justice is a liberal conception, by extension Rawls's conception of persons is
presumed to be a metaphysical conception.
184
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An instance of this brand of argument is found in Jaggar' s outline of liberal
theory's conception of persons. Jaggar states that "Liberal theory is unified... by certain
assumptions about human nature that constitute the philosophical foundation of the
theory." 186 From this broad assumption that all liberal theories-including Rawls'smake especial assumptions about persons, Jaggar then enumerates a list of "metaphysical
assumption[s]" that undergirds the liberal conception of human beings. 187 In doing so,
Jaggar infers that Rawls, consonant with other liberal theorists, employs a metaphysical
conception of persons.
A second and more recent trend within feminist theory has been to make the
charge of metaphysics by way of a communitarian-type argument. 188 (Regardless of
whether feminists explicitly or implicitly rely upon communitarian arguments, feminists
have nevertheless begun to employ an argument unmistakably communitarian in
appearance. 189 )
To understand the direction this argument takes, recall two postulates in Rawls's
theory of justice. The first is the assumption that parties in the original position are to be
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consider a self "prior to the ends which are affirmed by it," 190 which is to say that the self
should be considered a subject prior to the ends (or conception of the good) that it
pursues. 191 The second is the way in which Rawls models the original position so that
knowledge about one's particularities would be disallowed in this initial position. Taken
together, these two postulates have led feminists to conclude that Rawls's description of
parties implies a conception of the self that is: ( 1) ontologically prior to their ends and
social context; and (2) possessing certain metaphysical qualities.
Rawls's description of parties in the original position, according to feminists,
relies on a "veiled" yet discernible metaphysical view of persons, which is "empty of all
metaphysical content except abstract reason and will." 192 That is to say, it is a conception
of the self which is barren save for two discernible metaphysical qualities: agency (i.e.,
the ability to act autonomously in choosing one's ends or conception of the good) and the
capacity to reason based on abstract, universal principles of impartiality. 193
These two metaphysical qualities ascribed to the Rawlsian self-in conjunction
with the notion that the self exists ontologically prior to its ends-have led feminists to
190
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claim that the Rawlsian selves exist "metaphysically prior to their individuating
characteristics." 194 Rawls's assumption here, as critics like Jaggar point out, "is that the
essential human characteristics are properties of individuals and are given independently
of any particular social context." 195 This is problematic, say feminists, for to regard
selves as possessing qualities of rationality and agency prior to their individuating
circumstances necessarily "slips into a metaphysics according to which it is meaningful to
define a self independently of all the ends it may choose and all and any conception of the
good it may hold." 196
For feminists, then, Rawls's moral individualism is not simply a first-order moral
view, but one that necessarily entails-and relies upon-a metaphysics of personhood. In
relation to individualism, feminists claim that Rawls subscribes to a particular form of
metaphysical individualism, which necessarily evokes certain assumptions about the
character of persons. As will be enumerated in the following section, feminists believe
that Rawls's metaphysical individualism supports a notion of the self that is necessarily
antithetical to society, social context, and personal attachments.
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Individuals and Social Context
As indicated, feminists contend that it follows from Rawls's description of parties
in the original position to mean that "human individuals are ontologically prior to
society ." 197 By way of this argument, feminists have concluded that Rawls's conception
of persons "begins from the premise of radical or abstract individualism." 198 This
premise, according to feminists, is indicative of the way in which Rawls perceives the self
as (metaphysically) abstracted from social context. Rawlsian persons, as it were, "exist as
actors logically, if not temporally, prior to the entry onto the social stage", which are
endowed with metaphysical attributes prior to their casting in the human drama. 199
In arguing that Rawls subscribe to a brand of abstract individualism, feminists
have made the following assumptions about the Rawlsian self and its relationship to
society and social context. First, feminist charge that Rawls portrays humans as atomistic
units. Elizabeth Wolgast claims that Rawlsian selves represent creatures that are
"complete in themselves, they are self-contained, independent, self-motivated, energized
from within-by passions and desires, Hobbes would say." 200 Invoking a similar
197
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Hobbesian "man as mushroom" imagery, Benhabib asserts that Raw ls presumes "that
people are by nature separate, self-contained, unrelated beings, somehow sprung into the
world fully adult and independent," 201 as Diana from Zeus's head.
Second, the Rawlsian self depicts human beings as asocial--or, to use Jaggar's
term, "solipsistic"-selves. Portrayed as isolated and removed from social relations and
communal attachments, feminists claim that Rawls's description of parties in the original
position as both mutually disinterested and ontologically prior to their ends intimates a
self that is alienated.
As a result, feminists have interpreted the Rawlsian self as liable to be averse-if
not diametrically opposed-to communal attachments. Hirschmann claims that Rawls
"depends on a conception of the individual that is at odds with community ." 202 Similarly,
MacKinnon maintains that for liberals such as Rawls "what it is to be a person is to be a
unique individual, which defines itself against, as distinct from, as not reducible to, a
group." 203 Feminists conclude that given Rawls's depiction of persons they are naturally
predisposed towards antagonistic relationships with others, and with communal goals.
Such persons are considered not only asocial but competitive (with inclinations of
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violence and aggression), which burdens those around them with the fear of being
"potentially threatened. " 204
Third, stemming largely from the assumption of mutual disinterest, feminists have
understood the Rawlsian self to be egoistic in disposition. Moreover, as an abstract
individual free from the entanglements of social context and the circumscription imposed
by social life, the Rawlsian self is predisposed to be the perfect egoist.
The Rawlsian self, Benhabib explains, "is a narcissist who sees the world in his
own image; who has no awareness of the limits of his own desires and passions; and who
cannot see himself through the eyes of another." 205 Satisfied with only selfish desires and
interests in securing its own welfare, the Rawlsian self appears to care not for others. It is
highly unlikely then, say feminists, that women would "formulate a conception of
[disinterested] rationality that stressed individual autonomy and contained such a strong
element of egoism as the liberal conception." 206
Fourth, feminists claim that the Rawlsian self is a disembedded and disembodied
subject. By holding that the self possesses an identity prior to having a particular
conception of the good, Rawls implies that ends and conceptions of the good are not
constitutive of a person's identity. As it were, he supposes that a person's identity-which
enjoys ontological priority-can be extirpated from a person's conception of the good.
204
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For feminists this implies two things. First, that "human beings are not
necessarily constituted by society but instead are capable, in principle of withdrawing
from society to redefine their own identity." 207 Rawls's assumption here "is that the
essential human characteristics are properties of individuals and are given independently
of any particular social context." 208 Second, a self's identity exists ontologically prior to
those communal, cultural, familial relationships in which people generally find
themselves embedded. 209
Feminists claim that what Rawls fails "to recognize is that all rational human
persons are always and already in human community." 210 People are embedded within a
particular social context that necessarily affects both their identity and their conception of
the good: their identity is "socially constituted." 211 To consider persons as existing
beyond a particular social context is to not consider "human selves at all." 212
The fifth and final assumption, concerns Raw ls' s depiction of society-a
depiction that has proven troublesome to feminists. If the Rawlsian self is indeed such an
atomistic, asocial, violent being-whose interests surely do not lie towards a social

207

208

1bid., 86.
1bid., 42.

209
210
211

212

Rawls, Theory, 563.
Tong, 35.
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of State, 46.
Benhabib, 89.

83

direction-then why would a society be formed at all? Why would it be rational for such
beings, given their nature, to confederate into such a social organization?
Feminists state that "the only satisfying explanation [Rawls] can offer for why and
how individuals form community is the contractarian one" based on mutual self-interest
(derived from rational choice). 213 According to Benhabib and Cornell, "Whether it be
welfare liberals like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, or libertarian, market liberals like
Friedrich Hayek and Robert Nozick, both groups view society as a system of mutually
advantageous arrangements."

214

As an arrangement of mutual advantage, Rawlsian

society is not the focus of communal goal or constitutive connections. Society is simply
instrumental in promoting an individuals' self-interests; thus, "the selfish self [is] forced
into community, on essentially empirical grounds," claims Rosemarie Tong. 215

Equality and Moral Personality
Given feminists' central program-the achievement of equality between the
sexes-one would assume that feminists would primafacie welcome Rawls's normative
claim that persons ought to be treated with equal consideration. Though feminists
support the notion of equality between the sexes in theory, the quandary for feminists,
according to Sally Alexander, "may be summed up in the tension between the plea for
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equality and the assertion of sexual difference. If the sexes are different, then how may
that difference (and all that it implies for the relative needs and desires of women and
men) be represented throughout culture, without the sex that is different becoming
subordinated?" 216 Feminists' contentions with liberal equality then hinge on whether
Rawls's theory can account for the relevant differences between men and women's
needs-as defined by feminists-when distributing political and social goods.
On the whole, feminists have concluded that Rawls's notion of equality will
generate sexual inequalities due to the fact Rawls' s conception of persons is grounded on
a gender-neutral conception of persons (which feminists have interpreted to be a male or
masculine). Selma Sevenhuijsen explains that for liberals such as Rawls "[t]he route to
liberation [via normative equality] involves the breaking down of inequalities and
differences. Justice can be perceived as consisting of a collective effort to dismantle all
mechanisms that maintain the division of humanity into two sexes." 217 Phrased
differently, equality as a normative claim aims not to treat persons differently based on
gender, but only to treat persons alike.
According to feminists, the reason sexual inequalities exist in the "relations
between the sexes" is because liberal theorists like Raw ls have failed to recognize that
inequalities are "based on inherent differences" between the sexes. 218 Because Rawls
216
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does not account for these differences between the sexes in his (gender-neutral) treatment
of persons, feminists claim that women will be discriminated against. Jaggar argues that
"the liberal insistence on 'formal' equality, which comes from viewing people as abstract
[and gender-neutral] individuals makes it easy not only to ignore the varying needs [and
interests of women] but even to claim that satisfying the needs of a certain group would
amount to 'reverse discrimination' or giving special privileges to women." 219 Rawls's
liberal equality, conclude feminists, refuses to treat women differently which "will
undermine rather than promote the cause of equality (understood in more substantive
terms) between men and women." 220
On another front, feminists argue that Rawls notion of equality is based on an
objectionable ideal of moral personality: that is, that parties in the original position
would have the capacity for a '"sense of justice" and a conception of their good. (I will
discuss the feminist objections to the capacity for a sense of justice here, and explore
feminist contentions with Rawls's conception of the good under the next section.)
Feminists argue that the notion of having a sense of justice is applicable only to a
male or masculine gendered self, not to a female or feminine gendered self. As described
by Carol Gilligan, men's moral "voice" is that of an "ethic of justice," much like Rawls's,
whereas women's moral "voice" is of an "ethic of care."
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Following the work of Gilligan and others, many feminists contend that men make
moral judgments from a justice perspective as depicted in Rawls's theory, while women
make moral judgments from an empathetic or relational perspective. Women and men
describe the "moral domain" in different terms: women view moral dilemmas "as a
problem of care and responsibility in relationships rather than a one of rights and rules,"
whereas men view moral dilemmas as a problem of "equality and reciprocity ." 221 Gilligan
explains "the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships,
which contrasts with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach." 222
The significance for feminists is that the "justice approach" articulated by Gilligan
is associated with men's moral judgment or reasoning which is, by extension, linked to
Rawls's theory of justice and therein his conception of the self. Rawls's derives moral
principles based on an ethic of justice. Analogous to Gilligan's description of men's
moral reasoning, the Rawlsian self claims rights and applies universal and impartial
moral principles to determine what is to be considered fair and equitable in social
relations. In contrast, women's moral reasoning accords with the "care approach," which
is based on responsibilities (not rights) and on the concrete relationships and social
context (not abstract or hypothetical situations as depicted in the original position).
Feminists conclude that women's notions of the moral domain-and therein their
moral judgments-are not applicable to Rawls's conception of persons possessed of a
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sense of justice. By grounding moral equality on the capacity of having a sense of justice,
feminists conclude, Rawls fails to acknowledge that women's moral reasoning differs
from that of men.

Conception of the Good, Rational Plans, and Conflicting Interests
While feminists do not generally challenge the idea that persons have a
conception of their good, they do object to the manner in which Rawls depicts this notion.
Here feminists claim that Rawls's conception of the good fails on two accounts. First, as
previously mentioned, Rawls does not account for the way in which a person's conception
of the good and values are communally derived. Second, feminists object to Rawls's
description of the parties as having a conception of their own good, yet being "mutually
disinterested" in the conceptions of the good held by others. Feminists interpret Rawls as
stating that "each human individual has desires, interests, etc., that in principle can be
fulfilled quite separately from the desires and interests of other people." 223
A person's conception of the good life, say feminists, is inextricably bound up
with and constituted by a web of personal attachments. Persons (particularly women who
are considered other-oriented) take as their conception of the good the welfare and
interests of others. However, such other-orientation is precluded, claim feminists because
Rawls's conception of the good fails to admit of the plausibility that persons will take as
their good the good of other persons.
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This brings us to feminist contentions with Rawls employment of rationality.
Following from rational choice theory, Rawls postulates that parties would be rational in
selecting principles of justice. The notion that it would be rational for parties to choose
principles of justice according to the maximin principle, however, has been met with a
barrage of critiques. Summarizing these critiques, Kymlicka relates:
Many people have criticized Rawls claim that that 'maximin' is the rational
strategy. Some claim that it is equally rational, if not more rational, to gamble on
utilitarianism. Others claim that it is impossible to assess the rationality of
gambling without knowing something about the odds, or about one's riskaversion. These critics allege that Rawls only comes up with the difference
principle because he rigs the description of the veil of ignorance so as to yield it,
or because he makes gratuitous psychological assumption which he is not entitled
to make. 224
Feminist criticism of Rawls's use of rational choice, however, is of a different
color. They are generally not concerned with whether Rawls's notion of rationality
effectively yields the difference principle or if it is indeed rational. 225 Feminists are
concerned with whether Rawls's notion of rationality favors men on a broader scale.
Many feminists claim that Rawls's methodology "of individualism and rational choice,"
necessarily, "betrays a masculinist [or male] bias." 226
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Recent feminist scholarship has devoted much attention to illustrating how
historically the notion of rationality has epistemologically reflected the interests, views,
and experiences of men. Throughout antiquity women have been associated with
irrationality stemming from their link to the body via their reproductive capacities, while
men have been associated with rationality originating from the mind. 227
The result of women's association with irrationality has led to women's exclusion
both from the sphere of rationality and the sphere of the political, because a person's
capacity for reason has long been the standard by which to judge a person's ability to
participate in the political domain. 228 According to Susan Hekman, the idea that "women
have been excluded from both politics and rationality since the inception of western
thought has become a commonplace that is rarely challenged." 229
While the above reading of history by feminists is theoretically questionable (as it
relies upon dubious contemporary psychological theories), we must ask why feminists
believe this pertains to women in contemporary society? Since women appear.to have
been fully incorporated into the political domain as citizens in society, why do feminists
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still consider rationality a notion that works to exclude women from the political sphere?
Are not women as rational as men?
Feminists have answered this question in one of three ways. First, the "feminist
rationalism" standpoint claims that women in the past were "unfairly excluded from the
respect which they are due as human beings on the basis of an insidious assumption that
they are less rational" than their male counterparts. 230 Thus, men and women should be
considered equally rational. Second, the ''feminist anti-rationalism" position claims that
we should re-valorize what has been historically touted as feminine irrationality (i.e.,
partiality, empathy, etc.). Third, the "feminist postrationalist" position has been to reject
the idea of rationalism altogether and call for a new discourse that would transcend the
present dialogue of rationalism. They advocate that neither the traditional "male" nor
"female" paths of rationality ought to be employed.
Of these three positions, the second has been the common position taken in
feminist evaluations of Rawls. 231 Feminists argue that it is the male notion of rationality
that is given priority in Rawls's theory of justice. What can be considered "male"
rationality, as illustrated in Rawls's theory of justice, and "female" rationality?
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To make this distinction between male and female rationality, feminists claim that
men and women reason differently: women reason from a care-based perspective and
men from a justice-based perspective. The connection between moral reasoning and
rationality is that based on differences in moral reasoning, feminist argue that men and
women have different interpretations of what is to be rational.
Feminists believe that the Enlightenment conception of rationality employed by
Rawls emphasizes the justice-based approach to moral reasoning that relies exclusively
on abstract, universal, and impartial criteria for choosing principles of justice. This
conception of rationality accords well with men's moral reasoning; however, "women,
who view moral problems in contextual, relational terms, are defined as inferior moral
beings, as deformed males." 232
Unlike women who reason morally from a contextualized position characterized
by personal relationships, Rawls attempts to achieve impartial rationality through a
hypothetical situation "by imagining that you and other rational, self-interested
individuals have to make decisions about basic social principles in ignorance of your
particular social position, special interests, sex, race, etc." 233
Contrasting impartial reasoning, feminists argue that women reason from a social
position of empathy "for they enable one to understand people who are different from
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oneself, and they are moral, for they prepare one to respond to people's needs." 234
Dissimilar to the generalizing involved in impartial reasoning that eliminates a sense of
the other and the particularity of their situation, empathy yields relevant information
about people and their unique needs. 235 It allows one the "capacity to put oneself in
another's positions" and effectively understand the needs of the other. 236
In sum, feminists reject Rawls's notion of rational choice as part of a larger
critique of Rawls's methodology: that is, Rawls's attempt to derive moral principles
based on an abstract, hypothetical model. This methodology, feminists argue, parallels
men's way of moral reasoning, not women's way of moral reasoning. As a result, the
"liberal conception of reason and rationality have rendered women's point of view either
'irrational or particularistic' or 'concretistic and trivial'," claim Seyla Benhabib and
Drucilla Cornell. 237
Lastly, we can turn to the issue of conflicting interests. Rawls's view that there
naturally arises a conflict of interest between persons due to the circumstances of justice,
feminists argue, presents an incorrect picture of society and personal relationships. That
is, Rawls portrays society as riven with conflictual and competitive human relationships,
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whereby "human beings are seen as tending naturally toward egoism or the maximization
of their own individual utility." 238
This depiction of persons, claim feminists, contradicts women's moral relational
disposition. For women, the self is "nurturant," "not competitive," "giving" and "caring"
of others in society. 239 Rawls's assumption of conflicting interests appears to be
depicting the experiences and moral orientation of men in his description of persons, not
women.

Freedom, Liberty and Autonomy
Rawls's interpretation of autonomy, according to feminists, miscasts the nature of
human beings (particularly women) and human relationships as it evinces a notion of the
self whose "only legitimate connection to others are those initiated by the individual or
agreed by him of his own free choice." 240
Feminists instead want to focus on moral autonomy for relational selves, which
must be viewed as "a morality of responsibility and care [that] begins with a self who is
enmeshed in a network of relations to others, and whose moral deliberation aims to
maintain these relations." 241 Feminists have delineated two types of autonomy--one
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pertaining to men's autonomy, and another to women's. Hirschmann explains, "the
differences in masculine and feminine experience can be seen to tum on two different
conceptions of autonomy, just as they turn on two different senses of self." 242
While most feminists view moral autonomy based on a conception of persons as
"self-in-relation," and not Rawls' s "separate self," there is no consensus among feminists
as to how one should approach the notion of moral autonomy. 243 Some feminists,
building on Gilligan's research, believe that "autonomy represents a peculiarly masculine
point of view," and thereby it should be abandoned for a notion of agency based on
women's intrinsic connectedness to others. 244 Because of autonomy's link with "'selfish'
individualism", feminist writers "have long viewed the conception of autonomy as
antithetical to feminists values [and their ethic of care]." 245
A majority of feminists, however, are not willing to dismiss the notion of
autonomy and human agency all together for some vague notion of interconnectedness. 246
In the wake of feminist theorists' "growing distrust of communitarian politics," and a
mounting skepticism of relational feminism, Anne Dailey notes, that there has been "a
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corresponding appreciation for individual autonomy." 247 Feminists have increasingly
questioned this juxtaposition of men's "autonomy" with women's "being in relation,"
which they see as dangerous theoretical move for women attempting to provide a theory
of women's liberation.
As a result, feminists have retained an appreciation for autonomy, however, they
support a brand of autonomy built on a relational sense of self. In contrast to "reactive
autonomy" (which feminists believe accurately reflects Rawls's style of moral reasoning),
"relation autonomy" (which feminists believe capture a women's moral reasoning) has
been the favored model of autonomy. Feminists argue that reactive autonomy
inaccurately "confuses autonomy with separation and independence from others," 248
while relational autonomy, on the other hand, "operates from a notion that the self is
conceived in terms of, and draws strength from, relations with others." 249
Akin to the notion of autonomy, feminists do not reject the normative value of
freedom and the concomitant desire for political liberty per se. Feminists, rather, take
exception to Rawls's interpretation of freedom as a distinctly "negative freedom," which
they again believe invokes an individualistic portrait of persons. According to feminists,
freedom for Rawls seems to be a matter of one's overcoming the obstacles of personal
attachment and the web of personal relations. Thus, Rawls must work "from an
247

248

Dailey, 1280.
Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1985), 97.
249

Hirschmann, Rethinking Obligation, 140.

96

assumption of separateness and freedom" in order "to understand how isolated
individuals can develop and sustain connections and still be separate, how they can

°

engage in relationships and still remain free." 25 For Rawls, say feminists, freedom is a
normative given: man is assumed to be born morally free.
Feminists, on the hand, argue that what is a normative given is not that we are
born free (in the liberal sense of the word), rather we are born attached and connected to
others at birth. Thus, the ideal of freedom is one where persons work from a position of
interconnectedness and social context. Feminists, such as Hirschmann, advocate an ethic
of care or "responsibility mode, beginning with connection, [that] tries to determine how
to provide space for the self without violating the moral imperative of care. This
perspective would indicate that although freedom is certainly achievable in the context of
human relations, it must be achieved; it is not a given. Freedom is an entity that must be
created, as an individual carves out space for herself." 251
In brief, feminists are not rejecting the value of freedom and autonomy. What
they are rejecting is Raw ls' s interpretation of these concepts through a masculine lens of
the separate self, which feminists believe presents an inherently flawed rendering of these
conceptions. Conversely, feminists suggest that these concepts must be reinterpreted in
the light of a relational conception of the self; thus, the desire for freedom and autonomy
takes on a different complexion than that valued by the Rawlsian self. While the social
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self indeed finds some value in the ability to act autonomously and free, it is always
exercised within the limits of a particular social context and within certain communal and
personal attachments that must be maintained and protected.

Conclusion
In examining feminist contentions with Rawls, we find them making a series of
claims regarding the nature of the Rawlsian self and its relationship to society. Plainly
feminists believe Rawls's conception of the self is metaphysically abstracted from social
context. This is demonstrated by their claim that Rawls assumes: (1) persons exist
ontologically prior to social context; (2) that the self is atomistic and asocial; (3) that the
self's identity, ends and conception of the good are not socially constituted; rather, they
are presocial conceptions that one voluntarily chooses, or self-wills; and (4) that the
normative values of freedom and autonomy ascribed to persons are acontextual.
Additionally, feminists have rejected Rawls's theory based on their description of
women as relational selves in contrast to the above interpretation of the self. Feminists
argue that Rawls's conception of justice does not differentiate persons based on sex-based
differences; thus, women are discriminated against because Rawls theory of justice is
incapable of detecting existing gender-biases in society and the "real" differences
between men and women. Moreover, the Rawlsian self is understood by feminists to
make moral decisions based on individualistic rationality which assumes persons make
moral judgments based on impartial, universal principles, which is in opposition to the
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way they believe women make moral decisions. Taken together, the above factors have
led feminists to conclude that Rawls's portrayal of persons is gender-biased.

CHAPTER IV
EVALUATING FEMINISTS' CRITIQUES OF THE RAWLSIAN SELF

Having outlined Rawls's conception of the self as found in Theory and Political

Liberalism and reviewed feminists criticisms of this concept, at this juncture, the
investigation will begin evaluating the aptness of feminist claims. In defense of Rawls's
conception of persons, I will argue that feminist contentions fail on two accounts. In this
chapter, it will be demonstrated that feminist claims are largely based on theoretical
misinterpretations of Rawls's conception of the self. In the next chapter, it will be shown
that the project of gendering the self-enabling feminists to distinguish male or
masculine attributes from female or feminine attributes-has proven highly problematic
particularly for those feminists advancing the argument that the Rawlsian self is male or
masculine. As a point of clarification, in presenting a rejoinder to feminist critiques, I will
draw primarily from Rawls's material as presented in both Theory and Political

Liberalism; thus, it should then be considered a defense of Rawls's conception of the self
as presented in both texts.

My interest in appraising feminists' critiques of the Rawlsian self is determining
whether their descriptions are indeed accurate portrayals of this self. Therefore, I will not
be concerned with the ongoing debate between feminists and liberals over an ethic of care
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or "care-based approach" to politics versus an ethic of justice. 252 While this debate has
served as one of the central battlegrounds between liberals (proclaiming the preeminence
of justice and rights in matters of politics) and feminists (proclaiming the superiority of
relationships and responsibilities in matters of politics), due to the limited scope of
inquiry I will attend only to those aspects of the debate that overlap with Rawls's
conception of the self.

Moral Individualism
Based on Rawls' s depiction of the parties in the original position, feminists have
concluded that he assumes the self can be viewed ontologically prior to social context.
Following this assumption, feminists further contend that the Rawlsian self entails a
metaphysical conception of the self. These twin factors have subsequently led feminists
to argue that Rawls subscribes to an untenable brand of metaphysical individualism, not
moral individualism.
The paramount problem with this line of criticism stems from feminists'
interpretation of the original position in Rawls's theory of justice. By claiming that the
Rawlsian self is a metaphysical construct ontologically prior to its ends, feminists have
assumed that the attributes ascribed by Rawls to parties in the original position conversely
apply to Rawls's conception of the self. Unfortunately, feminists have not provided any
substantive justifications for doing so.
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As Rawls has rightly argued, this criticism is the product of a misinterpretation of
the notion of the original position in both Theory and Political Liberalism. Rawls
acknowledges that by employing a conception such as the original position there are
bound to be '~certain dangers" because "its abstractness invites misunderstanding." 253 For
those viewing parties in the original position as a metaphysical conception of the self,
however, are suffering from an unfortunate "illusion caused by not seeing the original
position as a device of representation." 254
As a hypothetical construct, the original position is aimed at modeling our
"considered convictions" in crafting a conception of justice. In Theory, Rawls states that
the original position was designed to be a fair procedure capable of yielding principles of
social justice, which "provide a way of assigning rights and duties" and "appropriate
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation." 255 Similarly, in Political
Liberalism Rawls states that "the original position as a device of representation ... models
what we regard-here and now-as fair conditions under which the representative of free
and equal citizens are to specify the terms of social cooperation in the case of the basic
structure of society ." 256 In either formulation, parties in the original position are
explicitly intended to represent persons (in Theory) or persons qua citizens (in Political
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Liberalism). They are not, as feminists would suggest, intended to represent an actual
description of the nature or constitution of human beings.
Regarding the veil of ignorance, Rawls explains, that it "has no specific
metaphysical implications concerning the nature of the self; it does not imply that the self
is ontologically prior to the facts about persons that the parties are excluded from
knowing." 257 At any point in time, embedded and embodied persons can simply "step"
into the original position to determine fair principles of justice in accordance with the
restrictions modeled into the original position. "When ... we simulate beings in the
original position," Rawls writes, "our reasoning no more commits us to a particular
metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self than our acting in a play, say of
Macbeth or Lady Macbeth, commits us to thinking that we are really a king or a queen
engaged in a desperate struggle for political power. Much the same holds for role playing
generally ." 258
Having illustrated that the original position itself does not yield a metaphysical
conception of persons in the way feminists suggest, we may ask whether feminists were
entirely wrong to submit that Rawls's theory entails a metaphysical conception of the self.
While the attributes ascribed to parties do not prima facie render a metaphysical
conception of the self, does this necessarily imply that Rawls' s theory in general is not
built around a particularly (metaphysical) conception of the self?
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The suggestion here is that if feminists are intending to charge Rawls's conception
of justice as presented in Theory with subscribing to a metaphysical conception of
persons, they should refocus their argument if it is to be at all cogent. That is, feminists
ought to look "outside" the original position to formulate their claim of metaphysics
instead of looking within the original position and extracting from it the attributes given
to the parties.
As discussed in chapter two, the original position as a device of representation
models what Rawls considers important about people's capacities and interests. Rawls's
theory explicitly embodies the claim that, when it comes to matters of justice,
people should be regarded as distinct from their particular natural endowments,
social position and ends, but possessed of a highest-order interest in their capacity
to frame, revise and rationally pursue their conception of the good-and such a
claim amounts to an assessment of what is important about people, what
constitutes their well-being. 259
It is in this sense that Rawls's theory is modeled around a particular conception
of persons.
Feminists should have been attempting to determine whether Rawls's modeling
the original position in this way amounts to a metaphysical conception of persons. Since
it looks as though one has to be thoroughly committed to Rawls's liberal understanding of
personhood, many theorists have concluded that this amounts "to a claim about the
metaphysical essence of people." 260
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In short, while feminists may not have been erroneous in their contention that
Rawls affirms a metaphysics of personhood in Theory, they were inaccurate in their
portrayal of this commitment. If feminists were to maintain that Rawls subscribes to a
metaphysical account of persons, they need to focus on the fact that the original position
frames a particular liberal account of persons-in which case, Rawls's metaphysical
conception of persons encompasses more metaphysical attributes than that which is given
to parties in the original position. 261
In Political Liberalism, Rawls outlines a similar set of assumptions about persons,
however, he is careful to declare that these normative claims are derived from implicitly
shared political ideals manifest in our democratic public political culture. In shifting the
theoretical bases of these claims, Rawls has eschewed any reliance on the metaphysical
entanglements found in Theory and thereby is insulated from feminist charges of
metaphysics.
If feminists want to renew their attack on Rawls's conception of the self from the

position taken in Political Liberalism, they must first attend to Rawls's shift from
defending his arguments against the charge of metaphysics, to defending his argument
against a comprehensive doctrine. In addition, feminists must consider other lines of
argument such as questioning the basis and scope of his notion of citizen. They may want
to question whether men and women have disparate notions of the ideal of citizenship-
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perhaps it is a masculine ideal of citizenship that is on display in Rawls's theory of
justice.

Individuals and Social Context
One of the leading planks of feminist criticisms of Rawls's conception of persons
is that it is premised upon a brand of abstract individualism. Analogous to the Hobbesian
"man as mushroom" notion, feminists claim that the Rawlsian self is painted as having an
identity and conception of the good that is formed separately from--or prior to-any
particular social context. In light of this interpretation of the Rawlsian self, feminists
contend that the Rawlsian self is atomistic, asocial, and egoistic. Thus, Rawls necessarily
miscasts the relationship between the individual and society. Society is depicted simply
as an arrangement for the mutual advantage of self-interested individuals whose aims are
inherently asocial, and whose identities and ends are presocially given.
The above arguments are misguided on two counts. First, feminists have relied
entirely on the description of the parties in the original position to make their claim that
Rawls's conception of the self is based on abstract individualism. Again, feminists offer
no rationale to explain why we should consider characteristics ascribed to parties as those
given to Rawls's conception of persons. Second, the charge that Rawls exhibits an
inattentiveness to social context and its relationship to persons in either Theory or

Political Liberalism seems inaccurate. As outlined in chapter two, Rawls discusses social
context and society at length in both presentations of his conception of justice.
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In JAF, Rawls references social factors in four specific ways. He claims human
beings are inherently sociable. He acknowledges that social context fashions human
desires and identities. He considers society as a cooperative undertaking amongst
individuals. Finally, he holds society and social life as a good in themselves.
In political liberalism, Rawls's depends extensively on social context in
formulating his political conception of justice as fairness. By situating his notion of
justice within a specific political context or community, Rawls's theory takes both as its
source and content those communally-derived values and understandings on display in
democratic society.
Given that Rawls recognizes the significance of social context in crafting his
theory of justice in both JAF and political liberalism how then does this relate to his
conception of persons? Does Rawls demonstrate that persons are not atomistic units, that
our identities, conceptions of the good, and interests are dependent on social context and
personal attachments, and that we are not self-interested, egoistic creatures? The answer
to each of these questions is yes.
In response to the feminist claim that Rawls views persons as asocial, atomistic,
asocial units it is demonstrated both in political liberalism and JAF that Rawls attends to
the idea that persons are embedded within a particular social context and that a person's
identity is reflective of the matrix of social influences and personal attachments in which
one is embedded.
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In Theory, Rawls demonstrates his concern not only for the" social formation" of
our conception of the good and interests, but also the way in which our "affections and
desires" and "the way our character develops through social interaction." 262 Primarily,
this concern is exhibited in his attention to how the "social system" influences these
aspects of a persons existence. 263 In addition, Kymlicka explains that the feminist claim
that Rawls subscribed to an atomistic conception persons based on abstract individualism
is simply "absurd" because it "add[s] absolutely nothing to the moral argument for liberal
politics."264
In political liberalism, Rawls brings the issue of persons and social embeddedness
to the forefront. Raw ls states that it is plain that
We have no prior identity before being in society: it is not as if we came from
somewhere but rather we find ourselves growing up in this society in this social
position, with its attendant advantages and disadvantages, as our good or ill
fortune would have it. .. Thus, we are not seen as joining society at the age of
reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into society where we
will lead a complete life. 265
It is from this standpoint-as beings positioned (or embedded) within a particular social
context-that we make decisions and deliberate over the principles of justice.
This bring us to answer the question: Is the Rawlsian self egoistic? In Theory,
according to feminists, Rawls's appears to invoke a form of egoism on two accounts.
262 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 16.
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First, Rawls' s employment of rational choice theory appears to be the explanation offered
regarding why citizens would agree to entering society and a conception of justice in the
first place. Second, because parties are touted as being mutually disinterested, feminist
contend, that this necessarily invokes a form of egoism.
On the first account: Following Theory's publication, Rawls's admitted that his
employment of rational choice theory was misleading as it suggested that persons enter
society (or agree to principles of justice) based on egoistic reasons of mutual advantage.
Rawls claims that he ''should have said ... that the conception of justice as fairness uses an
account of rational choice subject to reasonable conditions to characterize the
deliberations of the parties as representatives of free and equal persons; and all of this
within a political conception of justice, which is, of course, a moral conception." 266 In
political liberalism, then, Rawls clarifies that rational choice is not used as a method for
explaining why persons would submit to the original position.
Careful not to invoke the sort of latent egoism on display in JAF, in political
liberalism Rawls emphatically draws a separation between the "Rational," which provides
the basis of how parties in the original position are motivated, and the "Reasonable,"
which is the public reason citizens in a democratic society would agree to the original
position. "Since this means that the Reasonable is prior to the Rational, and embodies a
variety of moral concerns, including claims about what sort of political community is
worthy of allegiance," Mulhall and Swift contend that we in turn "have no grounds for
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regarding Rawls's use of rational choice machinery as a sign that he is an asocial
[egoistic] individualist in the substantive sense." 267
On the second account: The notion that Rawls's conception of persons is egoistic,
based on his description of parties in the original position, is also groundless. As
discussed in chapter two, there is no way to determine whether interests of parties in the
original position are egoistic, altruistic, etc. Because the interest of parties are simply of a
self, not in a self.
Contrary to feminists' depiction of Rawls's conception of persons as "the
radically individuated man-as-mushroom," Rawls does take into account the social
embeddedness of persons. 268 As Moore and others correctly argue, feminists have erred
"in tarring Rawls with the brush of Hobbesian individualism" and "discounts the broader
context within which Rawls places his subject, which is first and foremost a social
order." 269 Indeed, both JAF and political liberalism are attentive to social context and to
the fact that human identities are developed within a social context.

Equality and Moral Personality
Feminists' contentions with Rawls's conception of equality do not deride it as a
normative principle. In arguing for sexual equality, feminists have often appealed to the
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notion of moral equality between the sexes. What feminists are concerned with is two
things: whether Rawls's conception of equality can account for the "real" differences
between men and women (e.g. reproductive capabilities) which place women at a
disadvantage; and does equal consideration based on moral personality exclude women.
First, given Rawls's description of the principles of justice in both Theory and

Political Liberalism, there is no reason to reject Rawls's notion of equality. It proves
capable of taking into account not only gender differences that handicap women as a
group, but also the fact that there exists a gender-structured society that has systematically
discriminated against women because of their sex.
In modeling the original position, Rawls has attempted to restrict factors that have
traditionally led to gender injustices and inequality of opportunity for women. Rawls
maintains that the "contingencies of endowment" are to be held morally arbitrary. That
is, "no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowment, any more than one
deserves one's initial starting place in society. ,mo Since parties in the original position
will not know their gender, and will have access to general knowledge about society as
gender-biased, Rawls contends that parties will choose principles "to the greatest benefit
of the least advantaged." 271 Parties, cognizant of the existing gender prejudices in
contemporary social institutions, would not choose principles discriminatory against one
gender. Thus, the distribution of basic social goods (necessary for equal opportunity)
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would not be based on natural endowments which could therein favor one sex over the
other. A theory supporting gender-biased institutions and patriarchal gender divisions
that place women at a disadvantage would be inconsistent with Rawls's principles of
justice.
While Rawls contends that all persons deserve equal consideration this does not
translate-as feminists suggest-into the principle that men and women should be treated
exactly alike when it come to matters of formal equality. Rawls's conception of equality,
according to the difference principle, theoretically allows for men and women to be
treated differently so that those "real" aspects that undermine equality between the sexes
can be accounted for. Accordingly, there is no reason to assume that Rawls's theory of
justice would be insensitive to gender differences.
The second contention feminists have directed at Rawls's notion of equality arises
from its dependence on moral personality. Consonant with the definition in Theory,
Rawls states in Political Liberalism that "[a] sense of justice is the capacity to
understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes
the fair terms of social cooperation's." 272 (I will treat feminists contentions with Rawls's
"sense of justice" here, and a conception of the good in the next section.)
Feminist contentions with Rawls's "sense of justice" stems primarily from
Gilligan's "two voice" thesis (also dubbed the "connection thesis") which contends that
men's moral reasoning is based on a sense or "ethic of justice" while women's is based
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on an of "ethic of care." 273 As has been noted, Gilligan has been broadly interpreted as
suggesting "that women's morality is concrete and contextual rather than abstract; that it
is nonprinciples rather than principles; that it is personal rather than impersonal; that it
motivates through care rather than through awareness of duty; and that it is structured
around responsibilities rather than rights." 274
While the empirical evidence alone effectively undercuts feminist arguments that
there exists notable psychological differences between men and women which manifests
in two different moral dispositions (which will be discussed in the following chapter)
many theorists have pointed to a second problem: that is, they have questioned the
potential of an "ethic of care" (versus an "ethic of justice") in providing a viable
alternative for selecting principles of justice by which to order society. While I will not
treat this at length for reasons explained at the outset, many theorists have concluded: ( 1)
an "ethic of care" and an "ethic of justice" converge on many points so that an "ethic of
care" collapses into an "ethic of justice" in many ways; and (2) an ethic of care is simply
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not a plausible alternative by which to order society where persons are not exclusively
connected in personal relations of care and face-to-face contact. 275

Conceptions of the Good, Rational Plans, and Conflicting Interests
Feminist contentions with Rawls's conception of the good take two forms. First,
feminists argue that his conception of the good does not comprehend the way in which it
is influenced by social context. Given that this contention has already been addressed, it
is the second contention that will be of interest: that is, feminists argue that Rawls's
conception of the good does not include personal attachments and other persons as
objects of a self's conception of the good.
In Theory, Rawls does not explicitly account for the way in which a person can
have as their conception of the good another person. However, in Political Liberalism,
he amends this. Rawls states that it is clear that a conception of "the good normally
consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want to
realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to various
groups and associations. " 276
With regard to Rawls's assumption that parties in the original position are rational
in selecting their life plans, feminists have questioned Rawls's use of rationality (i.e.,
rational choice theory). Parties are rational, Rawls states, if they "schedule their more
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important endeavors and allocate their various resources (including those of mind and
body, time and energy) so as to pursue their conception of the good over a complete life,
if not in the most rational, then at least in a sensible (or satisfactory), way." 277 This
characterization of rationality, however, does not seem to be a bone of contention for
feminists.
What feminists appear to be disagreeing with is Rawls's methodology on the
whole. That is, the way in which Rawls's derives principles of justice through the
employment of an abstract, hypothetical construct is questionable. Thus, the manner
feminists object to Rawls's methodology is that it is gender-biased concept.
Unfortunately, feminists rely heavily on the empirical claim that men and women reason
differently in generating their argument against Rawls's methodology. Again, as will be
discussed in the following chapter, there exists no conclusive empirical evidence that
demonstrates men are more adroit at making moral decisions based on hypothetical
situations, and women are more apt to make moral decisions based on concrete,
contextual situations. If this is the case, then, feminists argument against Rawls's
methodology along gender lines collapses.
Lastly, feminists have questioned Rawls's assumption that there will inevitably be
conflicting interests, instead they suggest that persons are inherently social and otheroriented. As indicated, Rawls does not present a conception of persons that are asocial,
egoists prone to hostility in competing for resources in society. Feminists have

277Ibid., 177.

115

gratuitously interpreted Rawls's notion of conflicting visions of the good to mean that
persons are naturally self-interested individuals inclined to aggressive, asocial behavior.
This was not what was intended by Rawls.
By claiming that persons will necessarily come into conflict with each other in
society, what Rawls is referring to is that because people have different conceptions of
the good, and because they want to secure those social resources requisite to obtain their
good, there will exist a certain amount of conflict in society. In Political Liberalism,
Rawls states that a "political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a
diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. " 278
Given the fact that people exist in a society that allows persons to form, revise and
purpose their conception of the good they are not all going to do so in the same fashion.
However, these differences do not have to manifest armed conflict, violent
behavior, or aggression as feminists imply. When Rawls speaks of persons having
different and conflicting conceptions of the good, he simply means that there are those in
society who hold feminist conceptions of the good alongside those who maintain
misogynistic conceptions of the good.

Freedom, Liberty and Autonomy

For the most part, feminists' contentions with Rawls's conception of freedom,
liberty and autonomy arise from their belief that he does not situate these concepts within

278Ibid., 3-4.

116

a social context, or ground these concepts on a relational sense of selves. Feminists argue
that people only exercise autonomy and freedom within a particular society, within a
particular community, and within a particular web of intimate personal relations.
Given the previous discussion on social context, it appears that feminist
contentions are erroneous. Rawls's commitment to freedom and autonomy presupposes
that that individuals exist within a particular social context and hold a variety of personal
attachments.
Freedom, for Rawls, is a matter of acting within a particular social milieu in
which persons find themselves embedded. As Kymlicka elaborates: "Liberal
individualism is ... an insistence on respect for each individual's capacity to understand
and evaluate her own actions, to make judgments about the value of the communal and
cultural circumstances she finds herself in." 279 Freedom as a normative conception is not
valued in and of itself; rather, it is simply an instrumental prerequisite for persons
desiring to pursue their own visions of the good. 280
The fact that JAF takes account of social context in many ways undermines
feminists' contentions that freedom is not viewed within a social environment. In
political liberalism, Rawls presents an even more situated sense of freedom. As
inhabitants of a democratic political society our belief that we are all free and equal,
manifests itself in three respects: First, as having the moral power to form, to revise, and
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rationally to pursue a conception of the good; second, as being self-authenticating sources
of valid claims; and third, as capable of taking responsibility for their ends." 281 In this
sense, the notion of freedom is derived from our communal existence.
With regard to autonomy, as suggested in chapter two, Rawls's conception of
autonomy can be considered "situated" or "embedded" autonomy both in JAF and
political liberalism. For Rawls, exercising autonomy in not a matter of separating or
abstracting one's self from personal attachments and existing social influences (as it is
logically inconceivable). Rather, Rawls's liberal autonomy is situated within a particular
context, which "involves critical reflection on inherited values, personal commitments,
and based good, not a flight from and abandonment of them"; moreover, it "engages our
understanding and responsibility at a deep level by engaging the capacity critically to
reflect upon moral and personal identity, itself already constituted by projects plans,
commitments, and strong evaluations." 282
In short, in both JAF and political liberalism Rawls's conception of freedom,
liberty, and autonomy seems to parallel feminist arguments for relational autonomy and
freedom based on a relational description of the self.
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Conclusion
By way of this evaluation, it appears that feminist contentions with Rawls was
based on several misinterpretations of his theory of justice. Given the fact that Rawls
attends to social context and personal attachments, it appears that Rawls's conception of
the self is nearer to feminists relational self than their version of the separate self
characterized as the Raw lsian self. Indeed, we find that feminists' conception of the
relational self and Rawls's conception of the self are not necessarily at cross-purposes as
feminist would have us believe.
On the matter of which conception of justice proved the most capable of
deflecting feminists' contentions, I think that political liberalism is best suited to counter
such claims. While JAF does make a puissant claim that persons are sociable creatures,
political liberalism better attends to social context, personal attachments in a persons
conception of the good, and deflecting charges of rational egoism. Nevertheless, both
formulations of Rawls's theory of justice have the theoretical resources to respond to, and
counter, feminist critiques of the Rawlsian self.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION:
PROBLEMATICS OF GENDERING THE SELF

In the wake of feminists' abandoning their "focus on the similarities between
individual men and women," much of contemporary feminist scholarship has been
devoted to the enterprise of articulating the differences between the sexes. 283 Indeed
many feminists have attempted to model a collection of attributes which women as a
group share in common-whether it be based on women's psychology, "essence, nature,
biology, or universal social position" and so on-that ultimately distinguishes them from
men.284
This project of generating a fixed set of attributes, traits, characteristics, moral
dispositions, and the like, unique to women's gender identity has garnered much support
from feminist scholars, particularly from relational feminists. Not only has this
undertaking held out the possibility that there exists "real" and discernible differences
between the sexes, but also that these differences could be cataloged for the purposes of
gendering the self.

283 Williams, 110.
284 Grosz, 84.

120

Of late this project of formulating an "essence" of womanhood has become
increasingly suspect, however, particularly among feminists influenced by postmodern
thought. While this group of feminists seem reluctant to abandon the notion that there
exist differences between men and women, and that gender influences a person's identity
to some degree, they argue that gender is in no way the primary determinant of identity.
Gender is simply one facet of a person's multi-faceted identity, and it intersects with a
whole host of other characteristics such as class, race, ethnicity, personal experiences, etc.
Regardless of how feminists go about gendering the self, their capability to do so
is of significance here, for it enables them to determine whether Rawls' s conception of
the self is gendered. If feminists cannot clearly demarcate gender differences between
men and women, because the division between the sexes is blurred or inconsequential,
then feminists cannot conversely make the claim that the Rawlsian self is gendered one
way or the other. Thus, the feminist claim that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine
self would collapse.
The aim of this chapter, then, is to explore the potential of three different
feminists' approach to gendering the self. In reviewing each of these paths to gendering
the self, I will evaluate the potential each has for gendering the self, and what bearing this
has on feminists' critiques of Rawls's conception of the self. In summation of the thesis,
I will provide a final answer to the question of wt.~ther feminiJts are correct in their
assertion that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine self.
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Relational Feminism
Relational feminism's approach to gendering the self is primarily defined by
several influential psychological and psychoanalytic works on gender studies, which have
aimed at demonstrating gender identity differences based on contrasting psychosexual
development. By virtue of the fact that men and women's paths to psychosexual
development are divergent, relational feminists contend that men and women have
disparate attributes and moral orientations.
For the most part, relational feminists base their claim of gender differences on
the works of Dorothy Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow, Juliet Mitchell, and Carol
Gilligan. 285 Of these theorists, however, Carol Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice, has
proved to be the most influential and widely received theory supporting women and
men's difference in contemporary feminist political discourse.
Gilligan's work has been broadly regarded as an undertaking challenging the
Freudian notion that women do not have as well-developed a sense of justice as men. In
critiquing the work of Lawrence Kohl berg's theory of moral development, which expands
Jean Piaget's popular "theory of cognitive growth," Gilligan presented a contrasting
vision of women's moral development. In so doing, Gilligan submitted that "Kohl berg's
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results were sex-biased against a moral orientation based on care, in contrast to his
position of a justice orientation as the goal for mature moral development. " 286
Gilligan believed that she had "discovered" that women and men have disparate
conceptions of morality, two different moral "voices." As highlighted previously,
Gilligan explains that: "The moral imperative ... [for] women is an injunction to care, a
responsibility to discern and alleviate the 'real and recognizable trouble' of this world.
For men, the moral imperative appears rather as an injunction to respect the rights of
others and thus to protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment." 287
Women form moral decisions based on a socio-historical context, or on particular
"social contingencies", suggests Gilligan. 288 Men, on the other hand, are more apt to
make moral decisions based on "hypothetical dilemmas" or universal abstractions. Men
are better able to extract themselves "from the history and psychology of their individual
lives and separate the moral problem from the social contingencies of its possible
occurrence. " 289
Furthermore, Gilligan argued that women's relationships with others were based
on an "ethic of care," while men's relationships with others were based on an "ethic of
rights" or an "ethic of justice." Here women's conception of the self emphasizes the way
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in which moral agent's often eschew formal rights, and instead focus on the cultivation of
intimate personal connections based on responsibilities, nurturance, selflessness and
empathy; whereas men emphasize a moral agents aptitude in acting autonomously and
separately according to formal principles of justice and universal rights.
In claiming that women's morality was based on an ethic of care, while men's
morality was based on an ethic of justice, then, Gilligan suggests that women's views of
the self are relational. In contrast, men view the self as separate, independent and
autonomous. Thus, "the contrast between a self defined through separation and a self
delineated through connection, between a self measured against an abstract ideal of
perfection and a self assessed through particular activities of care, becomes clear": the
female gendered self views moral decisions through the activities of connection and care
for others and the male gendered self views moral decisions through the application of
abstract, universal principles of justice and rights. 290
Though Gilligan's study was a work in moral psychology, feminist political
theorists have made extensive use of Gilligan's research in their critique of the liberal
self. 291 (Many of the critiques targeting Raw ls' s conception of the self in chapter three
were directly inspired by Gilligan's research on the so-called differences between men
and women.) The reason for this, according to Cass Sunstein, is that
Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral development is closely connected with
prominent approaches to questions of social justice. If Kohl berg's theory of
290Ibid., 35.
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development is based on male norms, and ignore an important alternative, the
same may be true of (to take a not entirely random example) contractarian theories
of politics. Thus, Gilligan's "ethic of care" is opposed, in much feminist work, to
the 'ethic of justice" associated with social contract theory, most notably that of
John Rawls. 292
Although one can speculate that Rawls would reject such a connection, Kohlberg has
nonetheless drawn a parallel between his highest stage of moral development and Rawls's
notion of parties in the original position. 293
Gilligan's popularity among feminists critiquing liberal conceptions of the self
then seems attributable to two things. Gilligan appears to have finally provided empirical
evidence in favor of associating particular "themes" and characteristics with female
gender identity. 294 Moreover, as Diana Meyers and Eva Fender Kittay suggest,
"Gilligan's work on moral development purports to offer empirical evidence ... that
undercuts standard [liberal] assumptions about moral autonomy, moral principles and the
universality of moral doctrines." 295
The employment of Gilligan's research to gender the self, however, is
significantly problematic for feminists on several accounts. First, Gilligan claims that she
is not attempting to ascribe traits along gender lines. Though relational feminists have

"92

.
- Sunstem,
2.
293

Richard Brook, "Justice and the Golden Rule: A commentary on some recent work by
Lawrence Kohlberg," Ethics 97 (1987): 363.
294

Bill Puka, "The Liberation of Caring: A Different Voice for Gilligan's 'Different Voice?"' in
Who Cares?, ed. Mary M. Brabeck, (New York: Praeger, 1989), 29.
295

K'ittay an d M eyers, 3.

125

considered Gilligan's work as outlining a set of gender-based characteristics applicable to
women, Gilligan herself argues to the contrary. Gilligan states,
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme. Its
association with women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through
women's voices that I trace its development. But this association is not absolute,
and the contrasts between male and female voices are presented here to highlight a
distinction between two modes of thought and to focus a problem of interpretation
rather than to represent a generalization about either sex. 296
Despite Gilligan's claim that she was attempting to uncover a pattern of care in
moral reasoning, however, relational feminists and critics alike have correctly regarded
Gilligan's research as an attempt to "account for care levels or care development...
characterized by gender rather than theme." 297 The assumption that Gilligan's implicit
intention was to articulate generalizations about gender along the lines of distinct
moralities, rather than uncovering a gender-neutral theme of care, is based on several
factors.
One factor was the type of issues Gilligan raised in her interviews, and who it was
she interviewed. For instance, on a study of abortion, Gilligan posed questions to
women, which she did not pose to men. Another factor was the fact that Gilligan was
inattentive to the differences between women based on age, race, class, and individual
particularity. This has led critics to challenge her claim that she did not intend to link
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different moral voices to a specific sex, because it appears as though she was preoccupied
with identity differences only along only gender lines. 298
Another factor, one which Bill Puka points out, is that Gilligan's own statements
suggest that her future objective was to uncover differences between men and women's
moral judgments. Gilligan states that her
findings were gathered at a particular moment in history, the sample was small,
and women were not selected to represent a larger population. These constraints
preclude the possibility of generalization and leave to further research the task of
sorting out the different variables of culture, time, occasion, and gender.
Additional longitudinal studies of women's moral judgments are needed in order
to refine and validate the sequence describe. 299
It appears here as though Gilligan is again concerned with generalizing gender-based
differences, rather than uncovering a gender-neutral theme of care.
Given the above factors, Gilligan's book is generally read by feminists and critics
as making the following claims:
The first is the empirical claim that women and men, as a matter of fact, differ in
their approaches to moral reasoning, with women emphasizing care and men
justice. The second is the value claim that since an ethics of care is at least equal
to, and perhaps better than, an ethics based on fairness, moral theory-which has
traditionally emphasized justice and ignored or trivialized caring relationshipsought to be restructured to take account of the importance of caring. 300
Our interest is in the first claim, because unless it is validated-that is, an ethic of care it
associated with womanly attributes-the second claim could be discussed in a gender-
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neutral way. This brings us to the second problem: Is Gilligan's empirical claim
conclusive?
From the outset, many theorists have raised serious objections to Gilligan's
methodology. In summarizing these objections, the empirical data Gilligan employs in
formulating her thesis is suspect in the following ways: First, the "all-female sample"
that Gilligan used in formulating a theory regarding the differences between men and
women does not include an adequate study of men in which to base her conclusions. The
salient question to be asked is how does Gilligan justify making claims about men's
morality when they were not included in sample groups and given the same questions as
women? 301 Second, Gilligan, according to Puka, used "open-ended interviews [where]
respondents emitted only those dilemmas they found personally salient." 302 Third,
Gilligan interviewed only a small number of people, which was not enough quantitative
data to formulate a credible argument. 303 Fourth, Gilligan did not take into account
individual differences among women. For example, samples drew on too wide a range of
ages in some of her studies. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, "Gilligan never actually
observed women go through the level of care ... Rather Gilligan reconstructs the sequence
of development conceptually in her book, by glimpsing a small interval of development in
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eight respondents." 304 Lastly, critics have argued that Gilligan's presentation of the data
is confusing. Luria explains "Gilligan does not draw a clear line between theoretical
speculation and discussion of data and slips from hunch, example, or metaphor to 'proven
fact. ,,,30s
Based on these methodological flaws alone, critics have concluded that Gilligan's
empirical evidence probably do not support her thesis. Consequently, many have argued
that Gilligan simply "oversimplified the case [for two separate moralities] and
overinterpreted the data," and that once "better controls are used the difference between
the sexes are more leveled." 306 Relational feminists, however, continue to insist that
there are gender-based differences between men and women. The question thus remains
is there any empirical truth to these arguments?
Though its has been over a decade since Gilligan published her findings "there is
not a consensus in the psychological literature either on whether females and males
reason differently regarding morals and, by extension, politics, or on why they do so
when gender differences in moral reasoning have been observed." 307 What seems to be
the consensus, Deborah Rhode maintains, is that
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most empirical studies of moral development do not disclose significant gender
distinction. Nor does related research reveal the kind of strong sex-linked

differences that relational feminism would suggest; there are few psychological
attributes in which the sexes consistently vary. For even those attributes, such as
aggression, spatial ability and helping behavior, gender typically accounts for only
about 5 per cent of the variance, the similarities between men and women are far
greater than the disparities, and small statistical distinctions do not support
sweeping sex-based dichotomies. 308
Making a similar conclusion, Muriel Bebeau and Mary Brabeck have tested
Gilligan's thesis in light of recent research on gender differences. What they found was
that "'[t]o date, the literature examining gender differences in moral reasoning as defined
by Kohlberg's theory do not support Gilligan's claims." 309 While there is much evidence
to suggest that "abstract reason are perceived as masculine traits", the "evidence from
observation of behaviors does not support the stereotype." 310 Extensive testing of both
men and women showed that "females use conceptions of justice in making moral
judgment as often as their male counterparts." 311
Nancy Eisenberg, Richard Fabes, and Cindy Shea conducted another review of the
literature on gender-based differences in moral reasoning. 312 What they found was that
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Based on the existent empirical data, it is not clear whether there are gender
differences in empathy, sympathy, and personal distress. Females tend to report
more of the emotional responses but they do not differ markedly from males in
nonverbal and physiological reactions ... The difference that does occur in
nonverbal indexes favor females, although it is possible that males simply mask or
inhibit their sympathetic and empathic reactions more than females. Given the
lack of difference in the physiological data as well as the nonverbal and self-report
data indicating more responsibility by females, we hypothesize that males and
females do not differ significantly in their tendencies to react emotionally to
other's emotional states (i.e., in empathy). 313
While Eisenberg, Fabes, and Shea obtained some evidence to suggest that women
exhibited more other-oriented behavior in attending to emotional needs than men, the
differences they located were not great "and account for relatively small amount of the
variance in individuals' emotional responding and moral reasoning." 314
At this point in time, it is reasonably safe to assume that there exists little
empirical evidence to suggest that men and women have different gender-based
approaches to morality. Since this is the case, why have relational feminists and others
continued to argue that there exists "real" differences between men and women?
Lawrence Walker hypothesizes that the notion that there are stereotypical
differences between the sexes is more mythic in origin that empirical. 315 "It is clear that
women have a greater reputation for altruism and empathy than do men, and that women
accept its validity," claim Catherine Greeno and Eleanor Maccoby, even though "studies
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do not show" this to be the case. 316 While men and women may intuitively perceive there
to be a difference between the male and female conception of the self, there is no
empirical evidence to substantiate this claim.
Accordingly, the third problematic presents itself: that is, many feminists are
skeptical of relational feminists' project to "rehabilitate traditional stereotypes as
'women's voice,' [because it] fails to come to terms with the extent to which the gender
stereotypes were designed to marginalize women." 317 Relational feminists have not
questioned the validity of these stereotype of women's gender identity; they simply want
to revalue the so-called feminine virtues traditionally linked to women.
On this point, Joan Williams claims that Gilligan's other voice parallels the
patriarchal view of the "pre-modern stereotype of woman" whose virtue and rationality
were prominent in Victorian times. 318 We should be skeptical of the reliance on intuition
of gender difference on display in relational feminism, warn Greeno and Maccoby, since
"women have been trapped for generations by people's willingness to accept their own
intuitions about the truth of gender stereotypes." 319
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Finally, feminists have criticized relational feminists for employing an essentialist
argument for gendering the self since in defining an "essential feminine subject" this
"involves positing an essential, asocial core that all women, qua women, share. ,mo
Because of relational feminists tendency to link women's nature exclusively to some
aspect of her biology or physiology (such as childbearing) to explain women's identity,
they have "generally failed to address variation across culture, class, race, ethnicity, age
and sexual orientation." 321 Accordingly, relational feminism has fallen to charges of
essential ism, which many feminists believe is fundamentally exclusionary.
In conclusion, feminist commentators have argued that relational feminists'
conception of the gendered self fails on two accounts. First, they erroneously assume that
the experiences of one group of women (e.g. white, middle-class, heterosexual) is by
extension the same for all women; thereby, they do not adequately acknowledge the
important differences between women. Second, relational feminists overstate the case
that gender exclusively constitutes women's identity. 322
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Cultural Feminism
Cultural feminism lies at something of a crossroads between relational and
postmodern feminism. Both relational and cultural feminists want to rely on a relational
conception of the self. However, the relational feminists emphasize "women's essential
connectedness to other human beings," while the latter emphasizes women's sense of self
as "a product of cultural forces alone." 323
In attempting to evade the recurrent charges of essentialism plaguing the work of
relational feminists, cultural feminists have endeavored to back away from this type of
argument and claim that women are relational selves to the extent that they are embedded
within a particular culture. Contra relational feminism, they argue that women are not
innately or naturally relational selves; rather, women view themselves as relational selves
based on certain cultural influences.
For cultural feminist, women's gender identities are "conceive[d] in purely social
terms," explains Elizabeth Grosz, and refer "to the attributions of invariant social
categories, function, and activities to which all women in all cultures are assigned." 324 In
short, the concept of the feminine gendered self is a socially constituted figure whose
attributes are fixed based on a particular class of gender-based experiences.
Given that women's gender identity is defined by activities and attributes present
within a culture, we may ask what culture entails for feminists. Culture, delineates Iris
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Young, "includes the symbols, images, meanings, habitual comportment's, stories, and so
on through which people express their experience and communicate with one another. "

325

These cultural images in turn become attached to particular persons, actions, institutions,
behaviors, etc., in society. Accordingly, a given culture articulates what constitutes
femininity and masculinity. For cultural feminists, "The culture identifies masculine with
the values associated with individualism-self-sufficiency, competition, separation, the
form equality of rights. The culture identifies women, on the other hand, with the values
associated with community-affective relations of care, mutual aid and cooperation." 326
To articulate the way these cultural symbols of gender have become internalized
in women's gender-identity-that is, how they describe women's sense of self--cultural
feminist commonly rely on Gilligan's research; as well as the works of Chodorow,
Dinnerstein, Mitchell. 327 For instance, Hirschmann (a social constructivist or cultural
feminist) relies explicitly on Gilligan's psychological studies to make her argument that
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women's identities are constructed by the dominant culture, and thus women have a
particular gender identity.
While cultural arguments about women's gender identity may seem more
appealing to feminists wishing to dodge essentialism, there are two fundamental
problems. First, many feminists argue that cultural feminists do not escape the charge of
essentialism. Hekman explains that cultural feminists "argue that subjects are essentially
socially constructed, that is, they want to replace the essentialism of liberal individualism
with an equally essentialist view of the subject as socially conducted." 328
Second-and more importantly-cultural feminists, in order to articulate gender
differences between men and women and account for the different conceptions of the self,
almost inevitably end up referencing psychological accounts to demonstrate this. Though
theorists such as Hirschmann claim to use the work of Gilligan simply to decipher
cultural manifestations of gender identity, they do not successfully evade the problem
hindering relational feminists' accounts of gender difference: there is no empirical
evidence to prove that men and women differ in their moral reasoning capacities and
sense of self. 329
Like relational feminists, what cultural feminists are doing is simply recounting
society's mythic notions of womanhood to embody the gendered self. "[C]ultural
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feminist reappraisal [of feminine characteristics]", Linda Alcoff states, "construes
women's passivity as her peacefulness, her sentimentality as her proclivity to nurture, her
subjectiveness as here advanced self-awareness, and so forth. Cultural feminism have not
challenged the defining of woman but only that definition given by men." 330
Accordingly, the cultural feminists attempt at gendering the self does not present a better
alternative than that offered by the relational feminists.

Postmodern Feminists
The term "postmodern feminism" should be regarded less as a fixed and coherent
brand of feminism than as a broader philosophical movement which has recently
influenced feminist thought; particularly, feminism's approach to gendering the self.
While some feminists have rejected this postmodern trend outright for its destructive
methodology, many feminists (postmodern or not) embrace postmodernism as a potential
corrective to the essentialist theorizing of relational and cultural feminism.
This aside, treating postmodern feminists as a group is difficult. In part, this
stems from postmodern feminists' inclination for "opacity, viewing clarity as one of the
seven deadly sins of the phallologocentric order." 331 While postmodern feminist share
some elements of similarity-that is, "they share what seems a common desire to think
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non binary, nonoppositional thoughts"-beyond this postmodern feminists appear to move
along different paths. 332
One theme postmodern feminists' arguments converge, however, is over an
approach to gendering the self. Unlike relational and cultural feminists, postmodern
feminists question the whole notion of "subjectivity" and in defining a concept or
category of women. 333 Postmodern feminists have accordingly attacked relational and
cultural feminists' attempts to identify a particular set of attributes common to all woman,
as it reinforces binary thinking.
Instead, postmodern feminists want to embody the self through a concept of
"positionality." The differences between cultural and relational feminists' projects at
gendering the self, explains Alcoff, and the postmodern feminists' project, is this:
When the concept "woman " is defined not by a particular set of attributes but by
a particular position, the internal characteristics of the person thus identified are
not denoted so much as the external context within which that person is situated.
The external situation determines the person's relative position ... The essentialist
definition of woman makes her identity independent of her external situation:
since her nurturing and peaceful traits are innate they are ontologically
autonomous of her position with respect to others or to the external historical and
social conditions generally. The positional definition, on the other hand, makes
her identity relative to a constantly shifting context, to a situation that includes a
network of elements involving others, the objective economic conditions, cultural
and political institutions and ideologies, and so on. 334
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Postmodern feminists argue that women and men's identities are reflective of their
position within the matrix of social relations; conversely, their identity is always in a
process of becoming. The concept of "women" can only be described within a fluid
context; thus, it is never fixed as it changes to reflect the context in which individual
women are embedded.
What postmodern feminists argue for then is a notion of "woman" as a "discursive
subject." That is, women are constituted by cultural factors to some extent, yet they are
also capable of constituting their own identity. The identity of woman "is the product of
her own interpretation and reconstruction of her history, as mediated through the cultural
discursive context to which she has access." 335
The effect of describing women in the above way departs from the notion that
there exists an "essential" quality or set of attributes particular one sex. "Gender
differences fa11 along a continuum, and context matters greatly in eliciting traits
traditionally associated with women", Rhode delineates; therefore, "It is misleading to
discuss gender-related attributes as if they can be abstracted from the distinctive social
expectations, opportunities and hierarchies that are also linked to gender." 336 Rather than
embodying the self with universal, generalized qualities, postmodern feminists contend
that we must look at the individual particularities of women-the position individual
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women find themselves at a particular interval of their lives-to embody the self.
Because it is altogether "misleading to try to identify traits as specifically female." 337
Supplanting cultural and relational feminism's project of identifying an
"essential" subject, then, postmodern feminists emphasize difference among men and
women, and among women themselves. Gender is simply one aspect among many others
that constitute a woman's identity, and the differences between women are beyond any
"essential" feminine gender. Indeed, it is "the postmodern call to give up the privileging
of gender, along with subject-centered forays into women's ways of thinking, acting, and
reconcieving theory and politics." 338
While I consider this description of gender accurate, it manifests two problems for
feminists gendering the self and providing a critique of the Rawlsian self along gender
lines. First, the postmodern feminists approach to the self cannot generate an definitive
set of attributes unique to all women. Thus, they cannot really gender the self at all.
Second, in being unable to delimit gender differences of men and women, feminists are
hamstrung in making the claim that the Rawlsian self illustrates attributes of a self that
are distinctly male or masculine. If postmodern feminists do so, they would have to rely
on an "essentialist" interpretation of the male or masculine subject. 339
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Having reviewed three feminist approaches to gendering the self (for the purpose
of providing a critique of the Rawlsian self) we are left with two alternatives. The first is
to endorse the relational and cultural feminists' approach to gendering the self, which
provides a set of gender-based attributes with which to contrast Rawls's conception of the
self. However, as indicated earlier, this alternative is theoretically untenable based on
empirical data alone.
The second alternative offered by postmodern feminists is perhaps the best
approach to the self: gender is simply one facet of a person's multi-faceted identity.
While gender may influence a person's identity at some level and with varying degree
among persons, it is in no way a primary determinant of a person's identity. The problem
here is that there exists no set of gender-based attributes to gender the self since the
division between a male or female gendered self is indeterminate.
Postmodern feminism then does not adequately provide the theoretical tools
necessary for claiming that the Rawlsian self is male or masculine; otherwise it would
have to invoke a brand of Enlightenment dualism. Relying upon the relational and
cultural attempts at gendering the self and claiming that the Rawlsian self is male or
masculine, however, proves to be empirically indefensible. We can conclude that none of
the feminist paths to gendering the self successfully proves that the Rawlsian self is male
or masculine.
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Concluding Remarks
In the preceding pages, I have tried to explicate both Rawls's conception of the
self (in both Theory and Political Liberalism) and feminist criticisms of the Rawlsian self
for the purpose of evaluating the debate. In so doing, my primary aim was to bring out
certain features of the debate, and to suggest where feminists criticisms have been
misplaced.
In the course of this argument, it has been shown that feminists face two tasks if
they are to successfully criticize Rawls's conception of persons in the future. First,
feminists must provide a better treatment of and more accurate interpretation of Rawls's
conception of the self. Moreover, they must attend to the recent theoretical shift within
Rawls's conception of justice-from JAF to political liberalism.
Second, if feminists exigency is to claim that Rawls's conception of the self is a
gender-biased construction, they will have to produce a theoretically (and empirically)
defensible way for doing so. That is, in order to claim that the Rawlsian self is male or
masculine, feminists must be capable of clearly articulating a self with gender-based
attributes for the purpose of distinguishing subjects.

WORKS CITED

Alcoff, Linda. "Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in
Feminist Theory." Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society 13 (Spring
1988): 405-436.
Alexander, Sally. "Women, Class and Sexual Differences." In Feminism and Equality,
ed. Anne Phillips, 160-175. New York: New York University Press, 1987.
Bebeau, Muriel J. and Mary M. Brabeck. "Ethical Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning
among Men and Women in the Professions." In Who Cares?, ed. Mary M.
Brabeck, 144-163. New York: Praeger, 1989.
Benhabib, Seyla and Drucilla Cornell, "Introduction: Beyond the Politics of
Gender." In Feminism as Critique, eds. Sey la Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, 115. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
Benhabib, Sey la. "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan
Controversy and Feminist Theory." In Feminism as Critique, eds. Sey la
Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, 77-95. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1991.
Benn, S. I. and R. S. Peters. The Principles of Political Thought. New York: The
Free Press, 1959.
Berlin, Isaiah. "Two Concepts of Liberty." In Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Michael
Sandel, 15-36. New York: New York University Press, 1984.
Bordo, Susan. "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought." Signs: Journal of Women
in Culture and Society 11, no. 3 (Spring 1986): 439-456.
Brabeck, Mary. "Moral Judgment: Theory and Research of Differences between Males
and Females." In An Ethic of Care, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, 33-48. New York:
Routledge, 1993.
Brook, Richard. "Justice and the Golden Rule: A commentary on some recent work by
Lawrence Kohlberg." Ethics 97, no. 2 (January 1987): 363-373.

143

Buchanan, Allen. Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism. Totowa, NJ:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1982.
Campbell, Tom. Justice. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc.,
1990.
Cederblom, Jerry and David W. Paulsen. Critical Reasoning. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1986.
Chodorow, Nancy. The Reproduction of Mothering. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1987.
Dailey, Anne C. "Feminism's Return to Liberalism." The Yale Law Journal 102 (1993):
1265-1286.
De Lue, Steven M. "The Idea of a Duty to Justice in Ideal Liberal Theory." In Liberals
on Liberalism, ed. Alfonso J. Damico, 95-110. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1986.
Dinnerstein, Dorothy. The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and
Human Malaise. New York: Harper Cholophon Books, 1977.
Di Stefano, Christine. "Dilemmas of Difference." In Feminism/Postmodemism, ed.
Linda J. Nicholson, 63-79. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Dworkin, Gerald. "Non-Neutral principles." In Reading Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels,
2nd ed. (1989). New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Public Man, Private Woman: Woman in Social and Political
Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
Eisenberg, Nancy, Richard Fabes and Cindy Shea. "Gender Differences in Empathy and
Prosocial Moral Reasoning: Empirical Investigations." In Who Cares?, ed. Mary
M. Brabeck, 127-143. New York: Praeger, 1989.
Flathman, Richard E. Towards a Liberalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1989.
Flax, Jane. Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodemism in the
Contemporary West. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990.

144

Friedman, Marilyn. "Feminism and Modem Friendship: Dislocating the Community."
In Justice and Economic Distribution, eds. John Arthur and William H. Shaw,
304-319. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991.
Gardbuam, Stephen. "Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community." Michigan Law
Review 90 (1993): 685-760.
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Gray, John. Liberalism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
Greeno, Catherine G. and Eleanor E. Maccoby. "How Different is the 'Different
Voice?'" In An Ethic of Care, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, 193-198. New York:
Routledge, 1993.
Grimshaw, Jean. Feminist Philosophers: Women's Perspectives on Philosophical
Traditions. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986.
Grosz, Elizabeth. "Sexual Difference and the Problem of Essentialism." In The
Essential Difference, eds. Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed, 82-97.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994.
Gunnell, John. Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation. New York: University
Press of America, Inc., 1987.
Gutmann, Amy. "The Central Role of Rawls' s Theory," Dissent ( 1989): 338-342.
____ . "Communitarian Critics of Liberals." Philosophy and Public Affairs 14
(Summer 1985): 308-322.
Henderson-King, Donna H. and Abigail J. Stewart. "Women or Feminists? Assessing
Women's Group Consciousness." Sex Roles 31 (1994): 505-516.
Hekman, Susan J. Gender and Knowledge: Elements of Postmodern Feminism. Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1990.
____ . "The Embodiment of the Subject: Feminism and the Communitarian
Critiques of Liberalism." The Journal of Politics 54, no. 4 (1992): 1098-1119.
Hill, Jr., Thomas E. "The Importance of Autonomy." In Women and Moral Theory, eds.
Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers. New Jersey: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1987.

145

Hirschmann, Nancy J. "Feminism and Liberal Theory." American Political Science
Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 225-233.

____ . Rethinking Obligation: A Feminist Method for Political Theory. New York:
Cornell University Press, 1992.
Holmes, Stephen. "The Permanent Structure of Antiliberal Thought." In Liberalism and
the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum, 227-253. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989.
Jaggar, Alison M. Feminist Politics and Human Nature. New Jersey: Rowman and
Allanheld, 1983.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. Reflections on Gender and Science. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1985.
Kittay, Eva Feder and Diana T. Meyers. "Introduction." In Women and Moral
Theory, eds. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers. New Jersey: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1987.
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1970.
Kukathas, Chandran and Philip Pettit. Rawls: A Theory of Justice and Its Critics.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.
Kymlicka, Will. Liberalism, Community and Culture. New York: Clarendon Press,
1989.

____ . Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. New York:
Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, Inc., 1990.
Larrabee, Mary Jeanne. "Gender and Moral Development: A Challenge for Feminist
Theory." In An Ethic of Care, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, 3-16. New York:
Routledge, 1993.
Lloyd, Genevieve. The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Luria, Zella. "A Methodological Critique." In An Ethic of Care, ed. Mary Jeanne
Larrabee, 199-203. New York: Routledge, 1993.

146

Macedo, Stephen. Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal
Constitutionalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Macintyre, Alisdair. After Virtue. South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press,
1984.
MacKinnon, Catherine. Toward a Feminist Theory of State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989.
____ . "Difference and Dominance." In Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law
and Gender, eds. Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy, 81-94. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1991.
Mendus, Susan. Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism. Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989.
Meyers, Diana T. ed. "The Socialized Individual and Individual Autonomy: An
Intersection between Philosophy and Psychology." In Women and Moral Theory,
eds. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers. New Jersey: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1987.
____ ."Moral Reflection: Beyond Impartial Reason," Hypatia 8 (Summer 1993):
21-47.
Mitchell, Juliet. Psychoanalysis and Feminism. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.
Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift. Liberals and Communitarians. Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell Publishers, 1992.
Moore, Janet. "Covenant and Feminist Reconstructions of Subjectivity within Theories
of Justice." Law and Contemporary Problems 55 (Summer 1992): 159-196.
Neal, Patrick. "Justice as Fairness: Political or Metaphysical?" Political Theory 18
(1990): 24-50.
Okin, Susan Moller. Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1979.

____ . Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books, 1989.
Pateman, Carole. "Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy." In Feminism
and Equality, ed. Anne Phillips, 103-126. Washington Square, NY: Basic Books,
1987.

147

Phillips, Anne. "Introduction." In Feminism and Equality, ed. Anne Phillips, 1-23. New
York: New York University Press, 1987.
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. Wittgenstein and Justice. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1972.
Pogge, Thomas W. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Puka, Bill. "The Liberation of Caring: A Different Voice for Gilligan's 'Different
Voice.'" In Who Cares?, ed. Mary M. Brabeck, 19-44. New York: Praeger,
1989.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971.

____ . Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Rhode, Deborah L. "The politics of paradigms: gender difference and gender
disadvantage." In Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, feminist politics,
andfemale subjectivity, eds. Gisela Bock and Susan James, 149-163. New York:
Routledge, 1992.
Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press, 1982.
____ , ed. Liberalism and Its Critics. New York: New York University Press,
1984.
Schor, Naomi. "Introduction." In The Essential Difference, eds. Naomi Schor and
Elizabeth Weed, vii-xix. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994.
Seigfried, Charlene Haddock. "Pragmatism, Feminism, and Sensitivity to Context." In
Who Cares?, ed. Mary M. Brabeck, 63-83. New York: Praeger, 1989.
Sevenhuijsen, Selma L. "The Morality of Feminism." Hypatia 6 (Summer 1991 ): 173191.
Sher, George. "Other Voices, Other Rooms? Women's Psychology and Moral theory."
In Women and Moral theory, eds. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers. New
Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987.
Sinopoli, Richard C. "Feminism and Liberal Theory." American Political Science
Review 85, no. 1 (March 1991): 223-225.

148

Sunstein, Cass R. "Introduction: Notes on Feminist Political Thought." In
Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Cass Sunstein, 1-11. Chicago: The
University Chicago Press, 1990.
Sypnowich, Christine. "Justice, Community, and the Antinomies of Feminist Theory."
Political Theory 21 (August 1993): 484-506.
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press,
1990.
Thiele, Beverly. "Vanishing acts in social and political thought: Tricks of the trade." In
Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory, eds. Carole Pateman and
Elizabeth Gross, 30-43. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987.
Thompson, Janna. "Sex Equality in Not Enough for Feminism." In Feminist
Challenges: Social and Political Theory, eds. Carole Pateman and Elizabeth
Gross, 99-111. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987.
Tong, Rosemarie. Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1989.
Walker, Lawrence. "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A
Critical Review." In An Ethic of Care, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee, 157-176. New
York: Routledge, 1993.
West, Robin. "Jurisprudence and Gender." In Feminist Legal Theory, eds. Katharine T.
Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy, 201-234. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc.,
1991.
Williams, Joan C. "Deconstructing Gender." In Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law
and Gender, eds. Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy, 95-123. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1991.
Wolgast, Elizabeth H. The Grammar of Justice. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1987.
Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1990.
_ _ _ _ . "The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference." In
Feminism/Postmodemism, ed. Linda J. Nicholson, 300-323. New York:
Routledge, 1990.

149

____ . "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques
of Moral and Political Theory." In Feminism as Critique, eds. Sey la Benhabib
and Drucilla Cornell, 56-76. Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press,
1991.

